The After Party: Electoral Consequences of Party Bans

Andrew Kao
Matthias Weigand*

November 2026

Abstract

We study the electoral consequences of political party bans. We assemble 1,850 party bans since 1900 in 143 countries, and pair them with two case studies and a survey on Germany's far-right AfD. We find, first, that bans in democracies do not reduce the vote share of the banned party's ideological faction. This is due to the re-entry of banned parties and neighboring parties shifting platforms toward the banned party. Second, bans raise the probability that this faction is in government, because the banned party is typically a pariah while neighboring parties need not be.

Keywords: party bans, elections, political competition, government formation
JEL Classification: D72, P16, K16

*Kao: Harvard University, andrewkao@g.harvard.edu. Weigand: Harvard University, mweigand@g.harvard.edu. Helpful and much appreciated suggestions, critiques, and encouragement were provided by Jesse Shapiro, David Yang, Daniel Ziblatt, and the Harvard Political Economy Workshop. We thank Serena Liu for excellent research assistance. Kao acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program.

1 Introduction

Governments ban political parties, including in democracies. A ban removes a party from the ballot to protect the constitutional order against it. In 2004, Belgian courts convicted the organizations that ran the Vlaams Blok, the largest far-right party in Flanders, and the party re-founded itself within days under a new name. In 1952, in its first party ban, the West German Federal Constitutional Court banned the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), a party led by former National Socialists, and prohibited any successor organization from forming. Germany now debates whether to ask the same court to ban the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party and the largest party in current national polls. In May 2025, the German public was split almost evenly on a ban, with 46 percent in favor against 44 percent opposed.[1]

A party ban protects democratic institutions from parties that seek to abolish them, but it also restricts freedom of expression and association. Both sides of this debate argue from the electoral consequences of a ban: proponents expect a ban to weaken the banned party's cause at the polls and keep its ideas out of power, while opponents expect the cause to survive or to grow.[2] Evidence on what bans actually do to elections is sparse (Bale, 2007; Casal Bértoa and Bourne, 2017).

What are the electoral consequences of a party ban? To address this question, we assemble 1,850 party bans in 143 countries since 1900 and link them to the elections held around each ban. We organize the analysis with a model of elections with party bans.

In the model, a ban removes a party but leaves voter demand unchanged. Party supply may adjust on two margins: on the extensive margin, the banned party may re-enter as a successor party, and on the intensive margin, the remaining parties may adjust their platforms. If the banned party re-enters, we call the ban incomplete, and the election outcome is unchanged. If the ban blocks re-entry, we call the ban complete, and the voters of the banned party move to the closest party, which gains votes and may enter government. The model thus predicts that the ideological faction of the banned party, the banned faction, retains its vote after a ban.

We use two case studies to illustrate two scenarios in the model. The Belgian ban in 2004 was incomplete: the Vlaams Blok, the largest party banned in a democracy in our data, re-entered as the Vlaams Belang. The SRP ban in 1952 was complete: no successor party was allowed to enter. For these case studies, we digitize district-level election results, candidate lists, and parliamentary speech. We also field a survey in Germany in September 2026 on the AfD, which won 20.8 percent of the vote in the federal election of February 2025. The survey shows what voters expect from a ban of a large party while the ban is still debated.

Our first finding is that bans in democracies do not reduce the vote share of the banned faction. The other parties of the banned faction retain the vote of the banned party about one for one: in our global data, we estimate a coefficient of 1.02. Outside democracies, retention falls below one.

[1] Ipsos, fielded May 9 and 10, 2025, among 1,000 eligible voters aged 18 to 75.

[2] In the German case, the motion before parliament argues that proceedings are the constitutionally provided defense against the party (Deutscher Bundestag, 2024), while the chancellor, opposing proceedings, doubts that a ban would resolve what drives voters to the party (ZDFheute, 2026).

The two case studies show two routes by which banned factions retain votes. In Belgium, the Vlaams Blok registered its successor, the Vlaams Belang, with an almost identical platform five days after the ban, and election results barely changed. This successor party was not less extreme: its candidates were more likely to contest elections again than other parties' were, and its candidates with traditionally Flemish names received better list positions and more preference votes than other candidates. In postwar Germany, the ban of the SRP followed shortly after the SRP's electoral success in Lower Saxony and was complete. No successor party entered, and none of the SRP members of the state parliament returned to office. The neighboring parties on the right instead gained the SRP vote. In parliamentary speeches, we find that parties on the right adopted the SRP's language.

The global data show the same pattern of stable voter demand and adjusting party supply after bans. Demographics predict the ideology of voters after a ban about as well as before it, and turnout changes little. On the extensive margin, 50 percent of banned parties in democracies reenter, either as a successor party or by merging into an existing party. On the intensive margin, parties shift their manifestos toward the banned party's platform, with parties of the banned faction drive this movement. Survey respondents expect a similar response to an AfD ban. AfD voters state that under a ban they would vote for neighboring parties, and 73 percent of respondents state that a ban would not change their attitude toward the AfD. The share of respondents expecting a new major party is 2.1 times as high under an AfD ban as without one, and respondents expect other parties to shift toward the positions of the AfD after a ban.

Our second finding is that party bans raise the probability that the banned faction is in government, by 8.2 percentage points against a pre-ban rate of 21 percent. Even before the ban, the banned party is typically a pariah—a party that other parties refuse to govern with—while the neighboring parties that gain its votes need not be. Survey respondents expect the same pattern for an AfD ban. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is the largest party of the right, and it is not a pariah. Under a ban, respondents expect the CDU to gain most in government participation, and the share expecting the center right in government rises from 64 percent to 82 percent. Support for a ban follows the opposite pattern. It is highest among the voters of the Greens, the SPD, and Die Linke, which gain almost nothing from a ban. Among the remaining parties, support for a ban is lowest among the voters of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which is also the largest beneficiary of a ban. The voters who most support a ban thus vote for the parties that gain least from it.

These findings bear on policy, with four qualifications. First, our study is positive: we examine the electoral consequences of a ban, and not whether a ban is justified. A normative judgment depends on the goals of a society, which may include the ostracism of specific organizations and personnel. Second, parties have influence beyond elections, and a ban may remove party funding, organization, and privileges; beyond our survey, we capture these effects only through their consequences for voting. Third, a ban may matter through channels our data do not capture: an ideology without a party may decline over time, and a ban may set a precedent for future govern-

ments. Fourth, democracies have other tools against anti-democratic parties, such as cutting party funding, placing a party under surveillance, refusing to govern with it, and prosecuting individual politicians. We do not compare these tools with outright bans.

Within this scope, three features of our evidence address common concerns. First, our analysis traces the vote of the banned faction over several elections after the ban, so it covers the medium run, and not only the short run. Second, the vote of the banned faction does not change in the elections before the ban, so voter demand and party supply do not systematically shift in the run-up to a ban. Finally, the factions in government before a ban gain no votes after it and become less likely to be in government, suggesting that incumbents in democracies have little scope to use bans strategically.

Related literature. We contribute to the study of militant democracy: how democracies may defend themselves against parties that seek to abolish them, and at what cost (Loewenstein, 1937; Müller, 2016). Legal and political scholarship examines when such defenses are legitimate and how democracies use them (Capoccia, 2005; Issacharoff, 2007; Kirshner, 2014; Bourne and Casal Bértoa, 2017; Bourne, 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Critics argue that bans restrict political freedom, invite abuse by incumbents, and discuss alternatives for democratic self-defense (Invernizzi Accetti and Zuckerman, 2017; Malkopoulou and Norman, 2018). The political science work on bans is mainly descriptive and focuses attention on why democracies ban some parties and not others (Capoccia, 2013; Bourne and Veugelers, 2022; Zeller, 2026).[3] The existing studies focused on the electoral consequences of party bans cover either single countries or small sets of cases (Bale, 2007; Casal Bértoa and Bourne, 2017). Closest to our work, Arenas (2021) uses the staggered enforcement of the ban of Batasuna across Basque municipalities to show that a longer ban reduced support for the banned movement, and Lublin and Wright (2014) find that across 73 countries outright bans did little to reduce the influence of ethnoregional parties. A related literature asks whether prosecution and repression provoke a backlash.[4] Our contribution to this literature is to assemble a global panel of bans linked to election results and systematically study how voters and parties respond to a ban. We demonstrate that in democracies, the banned faction retains its vote.

Our results also relate to the economics of political competition with entry. In spatial models, the number and positions of parties respond to the threat of entry and to the costs of running (A. Downs, 1957; Palfrey, 1984; Feddersen et al., 1990; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Mainstream parties respond to the success of niche and radical parties by moving toward their positions (Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006; Spanje, 2010; Klüver and Spoon, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020; Spoon and Klüver, 2020), although such accommodation does not reduce radical-right support (Chou et al., 2021; Krause et al., 2023). Mainstream parties may lose

[3]Case studies cover the dissolution of parties in Turkey, the re-founding of the Vlaams Blok, the attempts to ban the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), and the ban of Batasuna, the political wing of the Basque separatist movement, in Spain (Kogacioglu, 2004; Erk, 2005; Minkenberg, 2006; Bourne, 2015).

[4]Hate-speech trials of anti-immigration politicians did not reduce the support of their parties (Jacobs and Spanje, 2020). Sudden censorship led users to adopt tools that widened their access to information (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018), and repression raises support for the opposition where alternative media exist (Pop-Eleches and Way, 2023).

voters when their platforms converge (Spoon and Klüver, 2019), and governments adopt the policies of radical parties that stay in opposition (Ellger and Klüver, 2024).[5] In contrast to most work on political entry, a ban removes a competitor rather than adding one.[6] On the intensive margin, how voters substitute to other parties following a ban is critical for electoral outcomes. Substitution patterns can be identified in differentiated product markets from the diversion of demand after a product is removed (Berry et al., 1995; Conlon and Mortimer, 2021), and in French runoffs an additional candidate draws votes disproportionately from the ideologically closest competitor (Pons and Tricaud, 2018). We find that when a ban removes a party, its voters move to neighboring parties, successor parties re-enter where the ban allows it, and remaining parties move toward the banned party's platform.

We also contribute to work on coalition formation and the exclusion of extreme parties. Theories of government formation relate vote shares and policy positions to office (Gamson, 1961; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Laver and Schofield, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Diermeier et al., 2003). Mainstream parties often decide to exclude radical parties, formally through a cordon sanitaire or in practice (W. M. Downs, 2001; Art, 2007; van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007; Heinze, 2018), and voters respond to whether mainstream parties will govern with radical ones (Jacobs and Pilet, 2025; Kelemen et al., 2025). How conservative parties engage the radical right shapes democratic stability (Ziblatt, 2017), and the exclusion of the Vlaams Blok changed which coalitions formed in Flemish municipalities (Geys et al., 2006). Under some conditions, mainstream parties govern with radical ones (Lange, 2012; Twist, 2019). A further literature studies how extreme views and parties become acceptable (Bursztyn et al., 2020; Valentim, 2021; 2024) and how persistent demand for the far right in Germany is activated when a party supplies it (Cantoni et al., 2019; Ziblatt et al., 2024). We find that a ban can move the votes of a pariah to parties that others will govern with, which can bring the banned faction into government.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents the prevalence of party bans and defines the concepts the analysis relies on. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 shows that banned factions retain their votes. Section 6 traces the two routes of vote retention through the case studies. Section 7 shows, in the global data and the survey, that voter demand changes little while party supply adjusts through entry and platforms. Section 8 examines government participation and support for a ban. Section 9 concludes.

2 Party Bans Around the World

Party bans have occurred throughout history and around the world. In this section, we present several descriptive facts about party bans and characterize several of their features. We discuss how we construct the data in Section 4.

[5] Adopting the core position of a party lowers its support only when that party is also ostracized (Spanje and Graaf, 2018).

[6] Closest to our analysis of complete bans, prior work has also discussed why parties may rename themselves (Kim and Solt, 2017), but does not discuss renaming in light of party bans.

Figure 1 summarizes the 1,850 bans in our data since 1900. Figure 1, Panel A, maps party bans by country. In total, 143 countries have banned a party, and there have been party bans in every populated continent. Most bans occur outside democracies: 204 occur in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above.[7] Autocracies often decree *mass bans* that prohibit many or all parties at once, often during regime change. Because autocracies typically lack free and fair elections, we exclude bans under autocracies from the subsequent analysis. We provide more facts about mass bans and bans under autocracies in Appendix A, noting that regime change and consolidation would heavily confound a deeper empirical analysis.

Figure 1, Panel B, shows that bans have occurred throughout modern history.[8] Bans often come in waves, with spikes after World War II, during decolonization in the 1960s, and following the fall of communism. Party bans have recently surged again. Since 2020, 251 bans have been decreed, with recent bans concentrated in Myanmar, Guinea, Russia, and Ukraine.

Figure 1, Panel C, shows that banned parties won meaningful vote shares in the elections they contested. Vote share distributions are similar for banned and never-banned parties, although banned parties are less likely to fall in the left tail. Among the 1,649 bans of parties with a measured pre-ban vote share, 659 removed a party holding at least 1 percent of the vote. Appendix Figure B.2 shows that banned parties also contest more elections than never-banned parties, despite eventually being banned.

We introduce three concepts to facilitate our analysis. First, a ban is *incomplete* if the banned party re-enters, as a successor party or by merging into another party, and *complete* if it does not.[9] In democracies, a ban is typically complete only when an authority also blocks successor organizations. We code the outcome of each single-party ban and find that 53 percent are incomplete.

Second, a *faction* comprises parties with similar ideology, classified in the global data as the "left", "center", or "right" (Section 4.1). The *banned faction* is the faction of the banned party. We typically investigate outcomes in this paper at the faction level.

Third, a *pariah party* is one that other parties refuse to govern with, whether through a formal agreement, as with the Belgian "cordon sanitaire", or in practice (van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007). A banned party is typically a pariah and unlikely to govern. Its successor and the other parties of the banned faction need not be pariahs. When votes switch from pariah to non-pariah parties, the set of feasible governing coalitions may change.

3 Model

We model the electoral consequences of a party ban. The model has five periods: a prior election in which the potentially banned party competes, a costly ban decision, an entry decision by the


[7] Under the V-Dem electoral democracy index, 307 bans occur in electoral democracies (Coppedge et al., 2024).

[8] Our full panel reaches back to 1852, but we observe only a handful of bans before 1900.


[9] An incomplete ban in which the banned party merges into another party may resemble a voluntary merger between parties, because in both cases votes previously split between parties pool within the new party. The primary difference between party mergers after party bans and generic party mergers is selection into merging: parties should voluntarily merge when they expect to gain votes, whereas bans are rarely voluntary.

Figure 1: Party bans since 1900


A: Bans per country



B: Bans over time



C: Pre-ban vote share



Note. Panel A maps the number of bans per country. Panel B plots the share of the bans since 1900 decreed in each five-year period. Panel C plots the distribution of the banned party's vote share in the last election before the ban. Observations are at the level of a ban in Panels A to C.

banned party, a campaign in which the remaining parties may change their platforms, and a new election. We are interested in understanding when a political party ban leads parties in the same faction to gain votes, and when campaign platforms may shift toward the banned party. We use

a stylized three-party spatial model to illustrate when these outcomes occur and what key mechanisms drive them. In Online Appendix E, we provide conditions under which these outcomes occur with general functional forms.

3.1 Setup

There is a finite set of parties $\mathcal{P} = \{a, b\} \cup \mathcal{O}$ that competes in the election prior to a potential ban. Let b be the party that may be banned, a be the party ideologically closest to b, and $\mathcal{O}$ be the set of other remaining parties, indexed by j, which compete in both elections.

Each party j has an ideal point $I_j \in [0,1]$, collected as $\mathbf{I} = (I_j)$. In each election, party j picks a platform x_j. For some results, we will assume that party b has the rightmost (largest) ideal point (the leftmost case is symmetric); under this assumption, a is the rightmost remaining party after the ban.

Voters have types $\theta \in \Theta = [0,1]$ distributed according to F. In an election, given competing parties A with platforms $\mathbf{x} = (x_j)_{j \in A}$, let $q_j(\theta; \mathbf{x}, A)$ be the probability that voter θ selects party j. We index the outside option with $j = 0$. This represents voters who do not turn out (or who abstain or cast protest ballots, etc.). We can write the number of votes received, turnout, and vote share as:

$$v_j(\mathbf{x}, A) = \int_\Theta q_j(\theta; \mathbf{x}, A)\, dF(\theta), \tag{1}$$

$$T(\mathbf{x}, A) = \sum_{j \in A} v_j(\mathbf{x}, A) = 1 - v_0(\mathbf{x}, A), \tag{2}$$

$$s_j(\mathbf{x}, A) = \frac{v_j(\mathbf{x}, A)}{T(\mathbf{x}, A)}. \tag{3}$$

Thus v_j is the mass of votes received by party j; without abstention, $T = 1$ and $v_j = s_j$.

Parties choose their platforms in each election to maximize their objective:

$$\Pi_j(\mathbf{x}, A) = \underbrace{G_j(s_j(\mathbf{x}, A), A)}_{\text{electoral gains}} - \underbrace{C_j(x_j - I_j)}_{\text{ideology}} - \underbrace{\eta_j K_j(x_j - x_j^-)}_{\text{switching cost}},$$

where G_j is increasing, C_j is convex with $C_j(0) = C_j'(0) = 0$, x_j^- is the platform of the party in the prior election, K_j is convex with $K_j(0) = K_j'(0) = 0$, and $\eta_j \geq 0$ measures the cost of changing a platform across elections. Parties trade off winning votes against staying close to their ideal point and deviating from their prior platform.

Timing. The game has five periods.

Period -1 *(prior election).* Parties $\mathcal{P}$ compete with platforms $\mathbf{x}^- = (x_j^-)_{j \in \mathcal{P}}$, leading to vote totals $\mathbf{v}^-$ and vote shares $\mathbf{s}^-$. We assume a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium whose platform ordering matches the ordering of ideal points. Parties choose platforms without a switching cost,

$\eta_j = 0$.[10]


Period 0 *(ban decision).* Authorities consider banning party b. The authority bans when its expected gain—which may include restricting problematic speech or actions, enforcing a constitution, or consolidating power—is greater than the cost of a ban, k_{ban}.

Period 1 *(entry).* If banned, party b decides whether to re-enter, possibly under a legally distinct identity. The party (re-)enters when the expected gain from entry—which may include electoral success, ideological adherence, or any other value the party attaches to its existence—is greater than the cost of entry, k_{entry}. If the party (re-)enters, it is assumed to keep the same ideal point and voter recognition of b, so that $q_b(\theta; \mathbf{x}, A)$ is unchanged.

Period 2 *(platform choice).* Once the set of competing parties is fixed, each active party chooses its campaign platform x_j to maximize Π_j.

Period 3 *(election).* Voters choose among the active parties (including the outside option).

Figure 2: Timing of the model



Note. The five periods of the model. The analysis conditions on the ban decision (shaded) and on the entry decision, and traces their consequences through the campaign and the election.

We condition the analysis on the ban and the entry decision, and do not model them further. We emphasize that both the ban and entry decision depend on (possibly inaccurate) beliefs. In particular, the authority may not have accurate expectations and may misanticipate the consequences of a party ban, while the banned party may also misanticipate the consequences if they re-enter. Thus, the authority may systematically ban parties that an authority with the same objective but rational expectations would not. Similarly, a banned party may re-enter even if it leads to worse outcomes for their faction.

Remark. Periods 1–3 correspond to three freedoms in a democracy: the freedom to form parties and contest elections (period 1), the freedom to choose a platform (period 2), and the freedom to vote according to one's views (period 3). The costs k_{ban} and k_{entry} are the democratic costs of restricting the first freedom: k_{ban} is the cost of prohibiting a party, and k_{entry} is the cost of also blocking successors from re-entering. The banning authority often controls the entry cost, and this may vary from nothing (in cases where banned parties re-contested the next election without

[10] Online Appendix E.1 gives sufficient conditions for this equilibrium. The prior election can also be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium that the ban disrupts.

re-registering) to prohibitive (in cases where attempts to revive a party were met with violence). Some democracies have also restricted the second freedom, by preventing certain positions from being expressed. We analyze each of these restrictions. Liberal democracies typically preserve the third freedom, so we do not consider restrictions on voter choice such as voter suppression or ballot stuffing.

Outcomes. Let $(\mathbf{x}^+, \mathbf{v}^+, \mathbf{s}^+)$ be the platforms, votes, and vote shares that result from the campaign in period 2 and the election in period 3. We study conditions under which three outcomes occur: whether the vote of the banned party stays with its closest competitor (empirically studied in Section 5), whether that competitor gains more votes than anyone else, the margin that matters for who governs (empirically studied in Section 8), and whether the remaining platforms shift towards the banned position (empirically studied in Section 7). These outcomes are electoral consequences that may matter most for party bans.

1. *Share gain.* Party a, the closest party to the banned party, gains vote share after the ban:

$$\Delta s_a = s_a^+ - s_a^- \geq 0. \tag{O1}$$

   Its empirical counterpart is the leave-out vote share of the banned faction, a primary outcome of interest.

2. *Largest gain.* Party a gains at least as much vote share as every other party:

$$\Delta s_a \geq \Delta s_j \qquad \text{for every } j \in \mathcal{O}. \tag{O2}$$

   This proxies for the chance that a leads or enters the government, another primary outcome of interest.[11]

3. *Platform shift.* The average platform of the non-banned parties moves toward the ideal point of the banned party. Let $\overline{x}^-_{-b}$ and $\overline{x}^+_{-b}$ be the vote-weighted average platforms of the non-banned parties in the prior and the new election.[12] The outcome is

$$|\overline{x}^+_{-b} - I_b| \leq |\overline{x}^-_{-b} - I_b|. \tag{O3}$$

   If b is rightmost and both leave-out means lie left of I_b, this is equivalent to $\overline{x}^+_{-b} \geq \overline{x}^-_{-b}$.

Remark. In the model, we study outcomes for the party closest to the banned party. In Online Appendix E, we extend results to the faction level.

[11] Gaining a plurality of votes typically makes a party the formateur and likely leads to it being in government. Within a government, Gamson's law states that coalition members receive portfolios roughly in proportion to their legislative strength (Gamson, 1961).

[12] $\overline{x}^-_{-b} = \sum_{j \neq b} v_j^- x_j^- / \sum_{j \neq b} v_j^-$ and $\overline{x}^+_{-b} = \sum_{j \neq b} v_j^+ x_j^+ / \sum_{j \neq b} v_j^+$, where the sums over $j \neq b$ run over all active parties other than b and exclude the outside option 0.

Different ban scenarios. We study electoral consequences under three different party ban scenarios. Under an *incomplete ban*, the party or a successor re-enters in period 1. Under a *complete ban with fixed platforms*, b is removed and the remaining platforms stay at their prior positions.[13] Under a *complete ban with endogenous platforms*, the remaining parties choose new platforms in the period-2 campaign. The first scenario also covers a ban that never takes effect.

3.2 A Three-Party Spatial Model

We analyze a stylized three-party example that delivers the three outcomes in closed form under each scenario. All proofs for this section are contained under Online Appendix Proposition 1. We show when these outcomes occur with general functional forms and distributions in Online Appendix E.

There are three parties, with ideal points $I_L < I_R < I_X$, where X is the party that may be banned and R is its closest competitor; thus $R = a$ and $X = b$ in the general notation. We assume that voters are uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$, always vote (no outside option), and always choose the party with the nearest platform.[14] Party j maximizes

$$\Pi_j = g_j s_j - \frac{\kappa_j}{2}(x_j - I_j)^2 - \frac{\eta_j}{2}(x_j - x_j^-)^2, \qquad g_j, \kappa_j > 0. \tag{4}$$

Prior election. In the prior election, $\eta_j = 0$, and the vote shares of the three ordered parties are $s_L = (x_L + x_R)/2$, $s_R = (x_X - x_L)/2$, and $s_X = 1 - (x_R + x_X)/2$. Substituting in vote shares and taking a first order condition, the equilibrium platforms are

$$x_L^- = I_L + \frac{g_L}{2\kappa_L}, \qquad x_R^- = I_R, \qquad x_X^- = I_X - \frac{g_X}{2\kappa_X}. \tag{5}$$

Parties L and X shade toward the center to gain marginal voters, while party R's vote share is independent of its own platform, so it chooses its ideal point.

Incomplete ban. Under an incomplete ban nothing changes, because the banned party (re-)enters with the same ideal point. Campaign platforms are the same and all voters vote the same way. All outcomes therefore weakly hold.

We emphasize two points about this scenario: first, despite their seeming ineffectiveness, many democracies pay the cost of a party ban without investing in barriers to entry. These costs may include a loss of democratic or international legitimacy, a loss of political capital, and the financial and legal costs of prosecuting a party. This highlights a central tension between protecting democracy and restricting the freedom to form parties (Bourne, 2018). Second, allowing the banned party to (re-)enter has no electoral consequences relative to the prior election. However, preventing entry may lead the outcomes we study to hold strictly, as shown in the following scenarios concerning

[13] This scenario may reflect an election in which the authority has restricted the set of possible platforms, preventing them from shifting towards the banned party. One may alternatively interpret this scenario as reflecting cases in which parties are banned shortly before elections, preventing meaningful changes in platforms prior to the election.

[14] Ties have measure zero.

complete bans.

Complete ban, platforms fixed. Under this scenario, X is banned, does not re-enter, and the platforms for parties L and R stay fixed. By proximity, every former voter for party X now votes for party R, so

$$\widetilde{s}_L = s_L^-, \qquad \widetilde{s}_R = s_R^- + s_X^-, \tag{6}$$

where $\widetilde{s}_L, \widetilde{s}_R$ are the fixed-platform vote shares. Consequently, party R gains vote share (O1) and gains more than party L (O2). Whether it also replaces L as the largest party depends on their prior sizes (and thus ideal points). The average platform of the remaining parties also moves toward party X (O3):

$$\widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-X} - \overline{x}_{-X}^- = s_X^-\left(x_R^- - \overline{x}_{-X}^-\right) > 0, \tag{7}$$

where $\widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-X}$ is the vote-weighted ideology of the remaining parties after the ban. This movement towards the banned party is purely compositional: although no platform has moved, the more right-wing survivor receives more weight.

Complete ban, platforms adjust. We now relax the fixed-platform restriction: in the period-2 campaign, the remaining parties can re-optimize their platforms, with $\eta_j > 0$. Note that party L faces the same marginal electoral return as before and so its platform remains at $x_L^- = I_L + g_L/(2\kappa_L)$. Without party X to its right, party R adjusts its platform to

$$x_R^+ = x_R^- - \delta, \qquad \delta \equiv \frac{g_R}{2(\kappa_R + \eta_R)} > 0. \tag{8}$$

Since voters to the right of party R are now captive, party R gains votes by moderating toward party L. This further increases party R's vote share, so O1 and O2 continue to hold. Outcome O3 holds if and only if the compositional effect dominates this moderation:


$$s_X^-\left(x_R^- - \overline{x}_{-X}^-\right) \geq \delta(1 - x_R^-) + \frac{\delta^2}{2}. \tag{9}$$

The lefthand side of this condition is the ideological shift from reallocating party X's voter to party R. The righthand side is the loss from R's endogenous moderation. Thus, O3 is more likely to hold when party X had a larger vote share in the prior election, when party R and party L have a larger gap in ideal points, or when ideology and switching costs are larger.

We provide a numerical example to illustrate these scenarios. In Figure 3, Panel A, party L leads before the ban. Under the incomplete ban in Panel B, the election remains the same. In Panel C, a complete ban with fixed platforms leads party R to gain vote share, sufficient for the average (leave-out) ideology to swing past the median voter. In Panel D, a complete ban with platform adjustment, party R wins the majority vote by shading towards the center. The average (leave-out) ideology still shifts right in comparison to the prior election, but less so than in the fixed platform case.

We provide conditions under which outcomes O1-O3 occur under each scenario with general functional forms and distributions in Online Appendix E.

Figure 3: A ban in the three-party model, three scenarios




Note. This figure displays vote-shares by party from a numerical example of the model in Section 3.2, as well as the vote-weighted mean platform for the non-banned party. The banned party X is in white, the successor party in grey, the left party in orange, and the right party in purple. The black line is the leave-out vote-weighted mean platform of the remaining parties analyzed in O3. In Panel B, a successor enters at X's platform. In Panel C, (re-)entry is banned and platforms are held fixed. In Panel D, (re-)entry is banned and platforms are allowed to adjust. Parameter values: $I_L = 0.3$, $I_R = 0.75$, $I_X = 0.97$, $\kappa_L = 25$, $\kappa_R = 2$, $\eta_R = 2$, $\kappa_X = 10$, $g_j = 1$.

Discussion. In the remaining sections of the paper, we provide empirical tests for this model. We call the voters' ideal points and how they choose among parties, which a ban leaves unchanged in the model, *voter demand*, and the set of parties and their platforms *party supply*. Section 5 tests whether the other parties of the banned faction gain votes following a ban in the global data (O1). We find that they do. Section 6 analyzes the sources of these gains in two case studies, corresponding to two scenarios: in Belgium, an incomplete ban, the successor party retained the votes of the banned party, while in Lower Saxony, a complete ban, neighboring parties retained much of the vote. Section 7 examines voter demand and party supply. We first show that voter demand is stable, a key model assumption. We then examine the two margins of party supply: whether the banned party re-enters, and how platforms shift after a ban (O3). Section 8 turns to government. Because banned parties are often pariahs even before their ban, the other parties of the banned faction become more likely to enter government (proxied by O2).

4 Data and Context

We combine three types of data from four sources: a global database of party bans linked to elections, case studies of Belgium and Lower Saxony, and a survey in contemporary Germany. Figure 4 lists the sources and the sections that use them, and Appendix Table C.1 lists the parties named in the paper with their English names and positions.

Figure 4: Data overview



Note. The four data sources of the paper, the type of ban each covers, and the sections that use it. The global database and its estimation sample are described in Section 4.1 and Appendix B, the case studies in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, and the survey in Section 4.4 and Online Appendix I.

4.1 Global Party Bans and Elections

Assembling a party bans database. We construct a global database of political party bans in three steps. First, we compile recorded bans from regional and global studies of party bans, also termed "proscription" (Bale, 2007; Bogaards, 2010; Lublin and Wright, 2014; Casal Bértoa and Bourne, 2017; Bernatskyi, 2024). Second, we search all political parties on Wikipedia for evidence of bans. Third, we search Google for "party ban" alongside each country name. We manually validate each event and code the party, country, year, banning authority, whether it was part of a mass ban, and whether it was complete. We keep the bans of political parties and drop the bans of supporters' clubs, religious associations, and other organizations that did not contest elections. To our knowledge, no other comprehensive dataset of party bans exists.

For each ban, we manually code results from the elections surrounding the ban (Appendix B.1). We link parties to PartyFacts (Döring and Regel, 2019) and, through it, to V-Party (Lührmann et al., 2024) for information on other parties competing in those elections and to the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al., 2024) for party platforms.

We define a *democracy* as a country-year with a Polity score of 8 or above (Marshall and Gurr, 2020) or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55 (Coppedge et al., 2024). We combine measures for completeness and to reduce measurement error, an approach standard in the literature (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2019). Results are robust to using either

measure individually (Online Appendix Tables G.3, G.7, and G.2). For robustness, we also use other V-Dem democracy indices.[15]

Factions. We classify parties into three ideological factions, left, center, and right, following Herrmann and Döring (2023), who infer parties' positions on a one-dimensional axis from Wikipedia tags (e.g., "far-right", "social liberalism", "Marxism-Leninism", "green politics"). This approach has the advantage of broader coverage than expert surveys, and also allows for a replicable procedure as new data arises: we use the same tags to estimate positions for parties on Wikipedia that Herrmann and Döring (2023) did not classify, including those with newly added information or with non-English articles.[16] We assign continuous ideological positions to factions using the cutpoints in Herrmann and Döring (2023). For parties without tag-based positions, we code factions from party histories, with large language models as independent blind coders (Appendix B.2). Our baseline estimates use the tag-based positions and, where these are missing, the LLM coded factions. As a robustness check, we use only the tag-based positions. Appendix Figure B.3 plots party positions and faction cutpoints, and also identifies prominent parties in each faction.[17]

In Appendix Figure B.4, we plot measures of ideological extremeness for banned and never-banned parties. Banned parties are systematically more extreme: they lie farther from the center along various metrics, and are more frequently the most extreme competing party than never-banned parties.

Outcomes. We analyze two primary outcomes. The first is a faction's *leave-out vote share*: the percentage of votes cast for parties in the faction, excluding the banned party when relevant. For the banned party's faction, this compares the other parties' combined vote share before the ban with the whole faction's vote share afterward.

The second is *government participation*, an indicator for whether a party of the faction is in government after the election, as the leading party or as a junior partner. For elections covered by V-Party, we use its coding of the parties in the cabinet. For the remaining elections of interest, we manually code government membership. As a robustness check, we restrict the outcome to the leading party in government.

Appendix Table B.1 reports summary statistics for the ban panel and estimation sample.

[15]Controls include population, GDP per capita, education, urbanization, and conflict. We impute missing years using the country mean and entirely missing country data using the overall sample mean. The imputation choice does not affect estimates in the latter cases because fixed effects absorb these controls.

[16]Party size is the primary determinant of coverage on Wikipedia. Among parties banned in single-ban events, we code the faction of 68 percent of parties with at least 1% of the pre-ban vote, compared with 47 percent of parties below 1%.

[17]For our case studies, we use seven finer-grained factions (far-left, left, center-left, center, center-right, right, far-right), as defined by Herrmann and Döring (2023), as we are able to validate these ideology estimates with confidence. We do not use these finer-grained factions in our baseline global specification because measurement error may attenuate results. We report robustness to using these finer-grained factions in Online Appendix G.3.

Party platforms and voter ideology. We measure party platforms using manifesto texts. For each ban, we score bigrams in the banned party's pre-ban manifesto by their *distinctiveness* (Fryer and Levitt, 2004), identifying terms used frequently by that party and rarely by others before the ban. We measure the platform similarity of the remaining parties to the banned party by their relative use of these distinctive bigrams. Online Appendix F provides details on the text analysis.

We measure voter ideology using the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al., 2022). For each surveyed country that bans a party, we use the nearest survey waves before and after the ban. Respondents place their ideological leanings on a left-right scale from 1 to 10.

Our global data provides estimates of the average consequences of bans in democracies, but do not directly speak to mechanisms. We use the case studies to illustrate key mechanisms in different ban scenarios, while our survey measures voters' expectations about these mechanisms before a (potential) ban.

4.2 Belgium, 2004: An Incomplete Ban

The Vlaams Blok was Flanders' largest far-right party, and the largest party banned in a democracy in our data.[18] The Vlaams Blok won 11.7 percent of the national vote in 2003 and 24 percent of the Flemish vote in June 2004, campaigning on a 70-point immigration program. In April 2004, the Ghent Court of Appeal convicted three associations that ran the party, including the one that received public funding, of belonging to a group that clearly and repeatedly advocated for discrimination. The Court of Cassation upheld the conviction on November 9, 2004. While the courts did not dissolve the party, the ruling threatened the party's public funding and media. In response, the party re-founded itself five days later as the Vlaams Belang with a lightly revised program. This was an incomplete ban, as the party was able to freely re-enter. For this case study, we digitize district-level results for the 2003 and 2007 federal Chamber elections surrounding the ban. We also collect full candidate lists for the 2004 and 2009 Flemish Parliament elections, including each candidate's name, list position, and preference votes.

4.3 Lower Saxony, 1952: A Complete Ban

Founded in 1949, Germany's Socialist Reich Party (SRP) inherited personnel and organizational structures from the Nazi Party (NSDAP). Led by former active National Socialists, it glorified Hitler and denied the Federal Republic's legitimacy. The SRP followed the Führer principle internally, maintained a uniformed formation modeled on the SA and SS, and ran a youth organization modeled on the Hitler Youth. In the 1951 Lower Saxony state election, it won 11 percent of the vote, including 33 percent in its strongest district and more than 20 percent in 15 of 95 districts. With 16 seats, it was the state parliament's fourth-largest party. In October 1952, the Federal Constitutional Court banned the SRP as unconstitutional in its first party ban, finding that it resem-

[18] This excludes mass bans and regime change events. No democracy since World War II has banned a larger party by vote share. The next largest cases in our data are bans in Turkey in 1998 and 2001.

bled the NSDAP in worldview, program, and political style.[19] The judgment dissolved the party, stripped its members of their Bundestag and state parliamentary seats, and prohibited successor organizations. This was a complete ban.[20]

Decided under Article 21 of the German Basic Law, the SRP judgment provided a definition of the free democratic basic order that established conditions for future bans. The court followed this reasoning in banning the Communist Party (KPD) in 1956. These are the only two parties ever banned in the Federal Republic. In 2017, the court found the NPD's aims unconstitutional but declined to ban the party because it lacked the potential to achieve its aims (Molier and Rijpkema, 2018). A party ban case against the AfD would be decided following these precedents. We digitize district-level results for the 1951 and 1955 Lower Saxony state elections. We also digitize state parliamentary speech surrounding the ban, applying the text methods of the global analysis to these speeches.

4.4 Germany, 2026: Survey on the Proposed AfD Ban

The AfD won 20.8 percent of the vote in the February 2025 federal election, placing second. Its 10.3 million votes yielded 152 of 630 Bundestag seats, making it the largest opposition party. In May 2025, the domestic intelligence service classified it as a confirmed right-wing extremist organization. Two motions to initiate a party ban against the AfD were introduced in the 20th Bundestag, a cross-party motion signed by 113 members and a motion signed by 43 members of the Greens.[21] Ban proposals have also been raised in 10 of the 16 state parliaments. In June 2025, the party congress of the governing Social Democratic Party (SPD), the main center-left party, publicly resolved to prepare a ban application. In February 2026, the Administrative Court of Cologne barred the intelligence service from applying its right-wing extremist classification to the AfD pending a decision on the AfD's own suit against the classification.[22] As of the time when we fielded the survey, no authorized body had filed a ban application.[23] If the AfD were banned, the ban would be unprecedented in size. The Vlaams Blok (Section 4.2) held 11.7 percent of the national vote in its last pre-ban election. In the week before our survey, the AfD polled at 28 percent.[24] Apart from South Korea's proposed ban of the People Power Party after the December 2024 martial law declaration, no other recent democracy has moved to ban the party leading its polls.

We fielded our survey from September 1 to September 4, 2026 among adult residents of Germany recruited through Dynata. Recruitment targeted 30 percent of respondents from Saxony-Anhalt and 70 percent from a representative sample of the rest of Germany. Saxony-Anhalt's state election followed on September 6, 2026, with the AfD winning 43.8 percent of the vote.[25] Our

[19] BVerfGE 2, 1, judgment of October 23, 1952.

[20] The SRP announced its own dissolution in September 1952, while the case was pending.

[21] Bundestag Drucksache 20/13750 and Drucksache 20/14105 of December 6, 2024. In Germany, the Bundestag, Bundesrat, and federal government can all apply to ban a party.

[22] Administrative Court of Cologne, decision of February 26, 2026, 13 L 1109/25.

[23] We present a timeline of relevant events in Online Appendix Figure I.1.

[24] Forsa for RTL Deutschland, fielded August 25 to 31, 2026, 2,504 respondents.

[25] Official results of the state returning officer of Saxony-Anhalt.

sample consists of 568 respondents, of which 173 stated they would vote AfD.

Each respondent answers questions about an upcoming state election. We ask respondents to report expected vote choices and turnout, expected party entry and entrant characteristics, expected platform changes among remaining parties, expected government composition, and each party's acceptability in government. We then ask respondents to answer the same set of questions under the scenario of the AfD being banned. Because each respondent evaluates both scenarios, our results describe voter expectations of a party ban rather than experimental estimates of a ban's effects. The specific questionnaire wording is presented in Online Appendix I.1, and we report the demographic make-up of our sample in Online Appendix I. This survey complements our historical data by recording voter expectations of a ban in a large, actively debated case.

5 Bans Do Not Reduce the Vote of the Banned Faction

Are banned factions able to retain the vote of the banned party? We answer this question using our global data and show that, in democracies, banned factions do retain the banned party's vote.

Sample. Our estimation sample comprises 508 bans in 53 countries. There are two constraints that narrow the 1,850 bans since 1900 to this sample (Appendix Figure B.1). First, we focus on mature democracies: at least one national election must occur within ten years of the ban in a democratic country-year.[26] This rule keeps 778 bans. Second, the banned party must have a position on the left-right scale and its faction's vote must be observed. This primarily drops small party bans.

Retention. We estimate how much of the banned party's vote is retained by its faction with the following regression specification

$$\text{voteshare}_{bt}^{lo} = \rho \, \text{voteshare}_{b}^{0} \times \text{Post}_{bt} + \alpha_b + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{bt}, \tag{10}$$

where $\text{voteshare}_{bt}^{lo}$ is the banned faction's leave-out vote share, voteshare_{b}^{0} is the banned party's vote share in the last election before the ban, and α_b and δ_t are ban and period fixed effects.

Figure 5, Panel A, plots the banned party's residualized vote share on the x-axis and the banned faction's residualized leave-out vote share after the ban on the y-axis. A slope of $\rho = 1$ indicates full vote retention: all votes for the banned party are reallocated to the other parties of the banned faction. The estimated coefficient is 1.02 (standard error 0.06), and we cannot reject a coefficient of 1 ($p = 0.72$). The estimate is consistent with full retention of the banned party's vote.[27]

[26] Defined as a Polity score of 8 or above (Marshall and Gurr, 2020) or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55 (Coppedge et al., 2024).

[27] This aggregate estimate could conceal changes in voter composition. For example, it is possible that the faction's new voters may have come from other factions (and the banned party's voters switched to other factions). In subsequent sections, we present evidence that voters for banned parties subsequently vote for the banned faction.

Event study. We estimate how the banned faction's vote share changes across elections using the difference-in-differences (DiD) specification

$$y_{fbt} = \beta \, \text{BannedFaction}_{fb} \times \text{Post}_{bt} + \Gamma' \left(X_{bt} \times \mathbb{1}_f \right) + \alpha_{bf} + \delta_{bt} + \varepsilon_{fbt}, \tag{11}$$

where y_{fbt} is an outcome for faction f in election t around ban b, $\text{BannedFaction}_{fb}$ identifies the banned party's faction, Post_{bt} identifies elections after the ban, α_{bf} and δ_{bt} are ban-by-faction and ban-by-election fixed effects, and $X_{bt} \times \mathbb{1}_f$ contains country-year controls (log GDP per capita, log population, education, and urbanization) interacted with faction indicators. The comparison units are the other two factions in the same elections. In the event study, we replace Post_{bt} with indicators for the number of elections since the ban.[28] Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level.

Figure 5, Panel B, presents the event study of leave-out vote share. Pre-period estimates are small and statistically insignificant. After the ban, the banned faction's vote share jumps immediately and remains elevated in subsequent elections. Because many banned parties had small vote shares, Panel C scales the same event study by the banned party's vote share in the last election before the ban. Each estimate thus measures the share of the banned vote held by the faction. Pre-period estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant. After the ban, the faction holds an average of 0.60 of the banned vote in each election.

The DiD estimate also implies high retention. In Equation (11), banned factions gain 4.8 percentage points relative to other factions (standard error 1.0, Appendix Table D.1). Scaling by the banned party's pre-ban vote share, the faction gains 0.83 of the banned vote relative to the other factions (standard error 0.11). Because the other factions in the estimate absorb the remaining votes, this is a lower bound on the share of votes retained by the banned faction. If the other two factions split the remainder equally, this implies the banned faction retains approximately 0.9 of every banned party vote. Full retention thus lies within the 95% confidence intervals of both the retention coefficient and the retention implied by the DiD estimate.


5.1 Robustness

Appendix Table D.1 reports estimates of the DiD specification in Equation (11) under different sets of controls. Even in democracies, party bans may coincide with economic or political shocks that favor particular factions. For example, a recession or democratic backsliding may differentially benefit the left or right. Subsequent columns address these concerns by adding controls interacted with faction indicators. Column 2 controls for log population. Column 3 adds economic variables (log GDP per capita, average years of education, and urbanization rate). Column 4 adds international and internal armed conflict. Estimates remain stable across columns. In column 3, the banned faction gains 4.8 percentage points.[29]

[28] We restrict to elections within twenty years of the ban.

[29] Conflict may itself respond to a party ban, which would make it a bad control. We therefore use the column 3 specification as the baseline for robustness tests.

Figure 5: Vote retention of the banned faction



Note. Panel A plots, in 30 equal-width bins, the leave-out vote share of the banned faction in the last election before and the first election after the ban against the vote share of the banned party in the last election before it interacted with the post-ban indicator, both residualized on ban and period fixed effects; the annotated slope is from the underlying (unbinned) regression, the retention coefficient of Equation (10). Panel B plots event-study estimates of the leave-out vote share of the banned faction, with the controls of Equation (11), with 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel C interacts the event-time indicators with the banned-faction indicator times the vote share of the banned party in the last election before the ban, so each estimate is the share of the banned vote the faction holds relative to that election; the dashed line marks one-for-one retention. The omitted category is the election immediately before the ban. Retention across regime types is in Appendix Figure D.1. Observations are at the level of a ban-period of the banned faction in Panel A and a faction-election in Panels B and C. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level.

We note that the retention slope is similarly stable when the same control sets are added to Equation (10) (Appendix Table D.2). Economic and other political shocks do not appear to drive our results.

We report further robustness tests in Online Appendix G. We first conduct a placebo test, randomly assigning bans to factions. This yields a randomization p-value below 0.01 (Online Appendix Figure G.1). We conduct a leave-out exercise and show that no single country drives our estimates (Online Appendix Figure G.2). Our estimate also remains stable when we vary the event window, exclude ambiguous bans, restrict the sample to more plausibly exogenous bans, and use alternative faction definitions, vote share sources, democracy indices, and clustering choices (On-

line Appendix Tables G.1, G.3, and G.5). Online Appendix G describes each test, and Online Appendix G.6 reports heterogeneity by ban characteristics.

Finally, we extend the analysis beyond democracies. Appendix Figure D.1 re-estimates the retention specification, including progressively less democratic country-years as one moves left along the x-axis. Retention is higher in more democratic samples: banned factions retain more of the banned party's votes in more democratic settings. In less democratic samples, retention falls below one, consistent with weaker electoral competition. Across the full global sample, the banned faction retains 0.42 votes for every vote for the banned party.

6 Case Studies

We use two case studies, Belgium in 2004 and Lower Saxony in 1952, to illustrate mechanisms behind the vote retention phenomenon we find in Section 5. In each case study, we examine how vote shares, party personnel, platforms, and government change after the ban.


6.1 Belgium: A Successor Retains the Vote


Belgium banned the Vlaams Blok in 2004 but allowed it to re-enter shortly afterward as Vlaams Belang.

Figure 6 displays vote shares before and after the ban. Panels A and B compare aggregate shares in 2003 and 2007, which barely changed within each faction. Vlaams Belang retained the Vlaams Blok vote almost one for one, leaving the far-right share nearly unchanged. In Panel C, we estimate our vote retention specification, Equation (10), at the district level. The district retention slope is 1.08: districts with larger pre-ban Vlaams Blok shares had larger far-right shares after the ban. Online Appendix Table H.1, column 1, reports a positive and statistically significant DiD coefficient from Equation (11).

What drove almost complete vote retention? In this case, the successor to the banned party kept a nearly identical name and also retained much of the banned party's personnel. Using candidate level data from the Flemish Parliament elections of 2004 (before the ban) and 2009 (after the ban), we investigate how personnel changed after the party ban. We present results in Online Appendix Figure H.1. While other parties kept only 14 percent of their candidates across the two elections, the Vlaams Blok kept 29 percent. This gap was larger among the candidates best known to voters. Among Vlaams Blok candidates in the top tenth by preference votes, 77 percent ran again in 2009, compared with 28 percent for other parties. Among its party list heads, 67 percent of Vlaams Blok candidates ran again, compared with 23 percent from other parties. This difference is not explained by changes in the party's relative success or candidate list size (Online Appendix Table H.2). Given the party ran on immigration as a key issue, we also examine whether candidate identities changed after the ban. In Online Appendix Table H.3, we show that new Vlaams Belang candidates in 2009 were more likely to have Flemish names. Flemish-named Vlaams Belang candidates in 2009 outperformed both Flemish-named Vlaams Blok candidates in 2004 and other

Figure 6: Belgium: vote shares around the 2004 Vlaams Blok ban





Note. Panels A and B plot aggregate vote shares by faction in the Belgian federal elections of 2003 and 2007. The banned party (Vlaams Blok, continuing as Vlaams Belang) is shown in white. Parties below 5 percent of the vote are excluded and shares renormalized. Panel C plots the district-level leave-out vote share of the banned faction against the pre-ban vote share of the banned party, residualized on district and year fixed effects.

Vlaams Belang candidates in 2009. This empirical pattern suggests that the party did not become less extreme after the ban.[30]

Vlaams Belang also kept the platform of the banned party. Its December 2004 program closely resembled the Vlaams Blok's June 2004 program (Verstraete, 2005). Experts place the party at the same position before and after its re-founding: 9.55 in 2002 and 9.67 in 2006 on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's 0 to 10 left-right scale (Jolly et al., 2022).[31] The party also remained a pariah,

[30] We provide further details to this analysis in Online Appendix H.1.

[31] The new party kept the Vlaams Blok's chair, members, and seats in all four parliaments (Brems, 2006; Pauwels, 2011). Its chair told the founding congress that the party had changed its name but not its program, and contemporary observers regarded the two as the same party (Mudde, 2004; Verstraete, 2005). The 2006 request to withdraw its public funding names the party "Vlaams Blok, thans Vlaams Belang" (Vlaams Blok, now Vlaams Belang) (Raad van State,

as the cordon sanitaire remained intact (van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007). After the ban, the banned faction had a 28 percentage point chance to win their district (Online Appendix Table H.1, column 2), but the far right remained out of government.

6.2 Lower Saxony: Neighboring Parties Retain the Vote

Unlike the Belgian ban, Germany's 1952 ban of the SRP was complete: it prohibited both re-entry and any successor organizations from forming. The SRP never contested a federal election: it was founded in October 1949, weeks after the first Bundestag election, and banned before the subsequent national election in 1953. We therefore digitized state election records from Lower Saxony, where the SRP had its greatest electoral success.

Figure 7 presents vote shares before and after the ban. Panels A and B show that the center-left share remained similar, while parties from the center right to the far right each gained part of the SRP vote. Across Lower Saxony, the remaining far-right parties gained 54 percent of the 1951 SRP share. In Panel C, we estimate our vote retention specification, Equation (10), at the district level. Under this complete ban, the district retention slope of the far right is 0.42, less than one for one. For the right as a whole, Online Appendix Table H.4, column 1, reports a positive and statistically significant DiD coefficient from Equation (11).

The postwar government strictly enforced the prohibition of successor organizations. No far-right party of comparable size entered after the ban, and former SRP politicians dispersed. Of the 18 deputies who served for the SRP during the state parliamentary term (the 16 seats plus two replacements), 2 ran again and none returned to office. Non-SRP candidates in the state parliament reappeared at a much higher rate (almost 40%, Online Appendix Figure H.1).


After the ban, the remaining parties of the right shifted their speech toward the SRP platform. We estimate a DiD using speech in parliament, and find that relative to other parties, the parties of the right closed 5 percent of the pre-ban gap between their parliamentary speech and SRP speech (Online Appendix Table H.5). Online Appendix H.2 describes the text analysis in detail.


The ban shifted votes from the pariah SRP to non-pariah parties on the right. The eventual right-wing coalition's vote share rose from 47 percent in 1951 to 58 percent in 1955. The coalition of the far-right German Party (Deutsche Partei, DP), the CDU, the expellee party Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE), and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) then took over the state government from the SPD. Districts with larger 1951 SRP shares swung more strongly toward the incoming governing parties (Online Appendix Table H.6). This was the only time the far-right German Party led a state government in the Federal Republic, and historians attribute the change in government to the SRP ban (Trittel, 1995; Hansen, 2007; Finkbeiner et al., 2019).

These two case studies illustrate two ban scenarios of the model. The SRP ban eliminated the party, its organization, and its personnel, while the Vlaams Blok ban left the party in place under a new name. Although the remaining far-right parties gained only 54 percent of the SRP share, the

2006).

Figure 7: Lower Saxony: vote shares around the 1952 SRP ban





Note. Panels A and B plot aggregate vote shares by faction in the Lower Saxony state elections of 1951 and 1955. The banned party (SRP) is shown in white. Parties below 5 percent of the vote are excluded and shares renormalized. Panel C plots the district-level leave-out vote share of the banned faction against the pre-ban vote share of the banned party, residualized on district and year fixed effects. The far right comprises the SRP, the DP, and the DRP. The DP and the CDU ran a joint list in 1951, which we split by each district's 1955 ratio of DP to CDU votes.

coalition the ban enabled took over the state government. In Belgium, the successor retained the vote but remained a pariah, and the far right remained out of government.

7 Stable Demand, Shifting Supply

Our model holds voter demand fixed while party supply may adjust through entry and platforms. We use our global data and our survey to show that voter demand changes little after a ban, while party supply adjusts on both margins.

7.1 The Stability of Voter Demand

A ban could change voter demand by changing voters' ideology or by changing party valence. For example, voters might change their positions on issues or priorities across issues. An official ban might also worsen voter attitudes toward the banned party (and others in its faction). We examine both potential channels through which voter demand could change.

We first examine whether voter ideology persists across a ban using data from the World Values Survey. Respondents to this survey report their ideology on a left-right scale from 1 to 10. We restrict the analysis to countries surveyed before and after a party ban. For each country, we first estimate ideology in pre-ban waves using demographic characteristics a ban cannot change—the respondent's sex and age—and use this fitted model to predict respondents' ideology after a ban.

Figure 8, Panel A, plots predicted ideology from pre-ban data against respondents' actual post-ban ideology. The relationship has a slope of 1.03 (standard error 0.08), suggesting little change in voter ideology across bans.[32] Because voters of banned parties are likely to sit at ideological extremes, we restrict our analysis to voters in their country's top and bottom quintiles in Appendix Figure D.2, Panel B. We find a slope of 1.03 (standard error 0.08). We note that the event study in Figure 5, Panel B, is consistent with voter demand remaining stable more broadly across time. We do not observe any systematic shift in demand toward or away from the banned faction in these pre-ban estimates.

We next examine whether a ban changes voters' valence towards parties. Because valence towards specific parties is not systematically measured across contexts, we make use of our survey evidence from Germany to provide evidence on this. Respondents are asked: "If the AfD were to be banned, how would your attitude towards the AfD change?" Figure 8, Panel B, plots the responses. 73 percent of respondents report that a ban would leave their attitude toward the AfD unchanged.


In Figure 9, we show how stated votes change under a hypothetical AfD ban. Panels A and B plot respondents' first-choice parties with and without a ban. Most parties keep similar vote shares. The largest beneficiary from a ban is the BSW, a populist party that opposes immigration.[33] Although the left-right scale places the BSW on the far left, respondents place it closest to the AfD on two key issues we ask about: immigration and a wealth tax. Thus, Online Appendix Figure J.3 shows that vote retention looks even stronger when we order parties by either issue, when compared to a conventional left-right axis. Figure 9, Panel C, shows this substitution at the individual level. We predict AfD voting from demographics and plot respondents' stated BSW vote share under a ban against that prediction. The slope across bins is 0.88. The predictability of voter preferences is consistent with stable voter demand.

Changes in voter preferences may also be reflected via voter mobilization. We find that turnout falls slightly after bans: from the pre-ban to the post-ban elections of the same ban, turnout changes

[32] As a robustness check, Appendix Figure D.2, Panel A, expands the predictors to include plausibly immutable characteristics such as education, income, occupation, ethnic group, and other characteristics listed in the figure note. Results remain similar.

[33] We plot vote gains by party in Online Appendix Figure J.2.

Figure 8: Voter ideology around party bans



Note. Panel A plots, across twenty equal-count bins, the mean left-right self-placement (1 to 10) reported by respondents surveyed after a ban against the ideology predicted for them by a country-specific model fitted on the pre-ban waves with the sex and age of the respondent. The dotted line is the 45-degree line; the solid line is the fit through the bins, with its slope and standard error reported in the panel. The sample is 51,692 respondents surveyed after a ban in the 19 countries of the ban panel with World Values Survey waves on both sides of a ban. Panel B plots the shares of survey respondents stating that a ban would make their attitude toward the AfD less favorable, leave it unchanged, or make it more favorable, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on binomial standard errors. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

by -1.2 percentage points (standard error 0.4) against a pre-ban mean of 75 percent. We discuss the possibility of voter backlash in Appendix D.2 and find little evidence that it can explain vote retention within banned factions.

Together, these results suggest that voter demand changes little after a ban. We next examine party supply.

7.2 Extensive Margin: Entry


We first examine the extensive margin of party supply. We find that banned parties often return to compete in elections.

Figure 10, Panel A, shows the fate of parties banned in democracies.[34] Banned parties return in 50 percent of cases, as a successor party in 28 percent of bans and by merging into an existing party in 22 percent of bans. In the model, the successor retains the vote of the banned party one for one after these incomplete bans (Section 3). Their prevalence may therefore explain part of the vote retention result. Online Appendix Table G.10 estimates the retention slope separately for the incomplete and the complete bans of the retention sample. In accordance with the theory, incomplete bans exhibit higher vote retention than complete bans, 1.08 against 0.82. Both slopes are close to one, and the difference between them is not statistically significant ($p = 0.27$).

Incomplete bans cannot fully explain vote retention, because complete bans are still prevalent. The share of complete bans is 47 percent across all regimes, 44 percent in autocracies, and 50

[34] We exclude mass bans because we did not code ban completeness for every party in these cases.

Figure 9: Survey: stated votes with and without an AfD ban



Note. Panels A and B plot stated vote shares among respondents naming a party, for an ordinary election and under the counterfactual AfD ban. The AfD is shown in white. Panel C plots, across twenty bins of the likelihood of voting AfD predicted from demographics (gender, age, education, income, employment, state, and language), the share of respondents stating a vote for the BSW under the ban. The dashed line marks one-for-one substitution. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

percent in democracies.[35] The correlation between ban completeness and the Polity score is 0.06. Democracies thus have both more complete bans and higher vote retention by the banned faction. In the model, a complete ban also moves the vote of the banned party to the closest party when voters choose freely (Section 3).

In Figure 10, Panel A, we report respondents' expectations of new party entry under an AfD ban. 60 percent of respondents expect a new major party after an AfD ban, compared with 28 percent in an ordinary election. A further 7 percent consider it likely that AfD politicians would join an existing party. Asked which party a new entrant would most resemble, 77 percent expect

[35] We define autocracies as country-years with a Polity score of -6 or below and democracies as country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above.

an AfD successor (Online Appendix Figure J.5).

We conclude our discussion of party entry by stressing that successful re-entry requires more than just the legal possibility of re-entry. Successful re-entry requires politicians to run again, and banned-party voters must coordinate on a successor. Our case studies illustrate two different responses to potential re-entry: In Belgium, the successor party retained the banned party's candidates and branding, and successfully re-entered (Section 6.1). In Lower Saxony, the prohibition of successor organizations dispersed SRP personnel (who largely chose not to contest subsequent elections), while SRP voters spread across existing right-wing parties (Section 6.2).

7.3 Intensive Margin: Platforms

Party supply also adjusts through platforms. In the model, the remaining parties may adjust their platforms after a ban (O3). Democracies typically restrict this margin less than entry.

To evaluate potential supply side shifts in party platforms, we measure textual similarity between the campaign manifestos of banned and remaining parties before and after bans. We provide details on this measure in Online Appendix F. We estimate the specification

$$\text{sim}_{jbt} = \beta \, \text{Post}_{bt} + \alpha_{bf(j)} + \varepsilon_{jbt}, \tag{12}$$

where sim_{jbt} measures the textual similarity of party j's platform in election year t to the pre-ban platform of the party banned in ban b, Post_{bt} indicates post-ban elections, and $\alpha_{bf(j)}$ are ban-by-faction fixed effects. The specification thus compares platforms within the same faction, before and after the same ban event.[36] We normalize each party's textual similarity by its gap in platform to the banned party prior to the ban. Coefficients therefore measure the share of that gap closed after the ban.

Figure 10, Panel B, shows that remaining parties in the global data close 7 percent of the manifesto gap after a ban. Appendix Table D.3 shows that the result is robust to controls, with an effect that grows 2.8 times as large after accounting for economic conditions.

Full convergence, or $\beta = 100\%$, is extremely unlikely, as it would require that platforms use identical text to the banned party following a ban. To quantify the magnitude of our estimated coefficient, we compare it against two benchmarks. Both are computed for remaining parties across consecutive pre-ban elections and scaled by the same pre-ban gap to the banned party. The first is pre-ban drift, the mean change in similarity to the banned party. Before bans, remaining parties move slightly away from the banned party's platform, by -4 percent of the gap per election (Appendix Figure D.4, Panel A). The post-ban movement thus reverses the pre-ban trend. The second is the mean absolute change, which measures typical platform movement between elections in either direction (6 percent). This benchmark is slightly smaller than our main coefficient; thus, a party ban moves platforms by approximately as much as all other factors that may change between two regular elections.

[36] Observations are weighted by pre-ban token counts, and standard errors are clustered by ban-by-faction.

We then examine whether parties in the banned faction move their platforms more than other parties. We estimate a difference-in-differences analog of Equation (12), adding an interaction between Post_{bt} and banned-faction membership, along with ban-by-period fixed effects. This compares platform movement within the banned faction with movement among other parties. The coefficient, plotted in Appendix Figure D.4, Panel B, is close to the single-difference estimate, indicating that the parties of the banned faction drive the platform movement toward the banned party.[37]

Our survey directly measures voters' anticipated party platforms with and without an AfD ban. We calculate each party's platform gap to the AfD under an AfD ban, and normalize it by the gap in an ordinary election. Figure 10, Panel B, reports estimates from Equation (12) using these data. Respondents expect remaining parties to close 9 percent of the perceived gap under a ban. Expected movement is positive for every remaining party on all three surveyed issues (Online Appendix Figure J.6).[38]

Thus, after a ban, the remaining parties move their platforms toward the banned party, and in the global data, it is the parties of the banned faction that drive this movement. In the model, the remaining parties re-optimize their platforms after a complete ban. Online Appendix Proposition 4 gives general conditions under which the average platform moves toward the banned party, but whether their platforms move toward the banned party is an empirical question. Our analysis suggests that platform convergence towards the banned party does systematically occur. Although a study of policy outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible that more extreme platforms may also translate into more extreme policies. For this to happen, however, banned factions would need to hold meaningful political power.

8 Bans Move the Banned Faction Into Government

A ban can change who governs even when the banned faction retains its vote, because banned parties are typically pariahs while the neighboring parties that retain their votes need not be.


Banned parties are pariahs. Banned parties are typically pariahs even when they compete in elections. Figure 11, Panel A, plots the probability that banned parties and the other parties of the same election are in government before a ban, conditional on vote share. At almost all meaningful vote shares, banned parties are less likely to be in government. Banned parties with 10 to 40 percent of the vote were in government 12 percent of the time, compared with 14 percent for the other parties of the same size.[39] Voters understand this phenomenon as well. Our survey asks

[37] Appendix Table D.4 shows that this result is robust to controls.

[38] Splitting remaining parties into the three closest and three farthest from the AfD based on each respondent's perceived distances yields similar results. Farther parties are expected to move more in levels, but their initial gaps are proportionally larger, leaving the share closed nearly identical across groups. Respondents do not expect the banned faction to close a larger share of the gap to the AfD (Appendix Figure D.4, Panel B).

[39] There are 154 banned parties that satisfy this criterion. We note that banned parties are typically pariahs long before the ban takes place. Their pariah status is not a result of the ban, as the figure demonstrates.

Figure 10: Party supply after a ban: entry and platforms




Note. Panel A, global data: shares of single-party bans in democracies (a Polity score of 8 or above in the ban year) in which the banned party re-entered as a successor party, at home or in exile; merged into an existing party without regrouping; or did neither (gone, a complete ban). Panel A, Germany 2026 survey: shares of respondents expecting a new major party under an AfD ban (successor); not expecting one but rating it likely (4 or above on a 1 to 5 scale) that AfD politicians would join an existing party (merged); and neither (gone). All three survey shares use the respondents answering both questions. Panel B: each bar is the share of the pre-ban platform gap to the banned party that all remaining parties close after the ban, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Global data: the coefficient on the post-ban period for all remaining parties in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55, with ban-by-faction fixed effects, on manifesto similarity to the pre-ban platform of the banned party (bigram distinctiveness), divided by the pre-ban gap between the similarity of the banned party to itself and that of the other parties, pooled across bans with pre-ban token mass as weights; standard errors clustered at the ban-by-faction level. Germany 2026 survey: mean expected movement of the remaining parties toward the perceived position of the AfD, divided by the mean perceived distance to the AfD; standard errors clustered by respondent. The movement of the banned faction relative to the other parties, the benchmarks, and the Lower Saxony estimates are in Appendix Figure D.4. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

how acceptable a coalition government containing each party would be if that party won the most votes. A government containing the AfD is far less acceptable than one including any other party (Figure 11, Panel B).

There are two mechanisms that can increase the probability that the banned faction is in government after a ban. The first is mechanical: votes shift from the pariah to non-pariah parties, and non-pariah parties can govern. Second, a ban consolidates votes within the faction. Even if the banned party was not a pariah, because parties with larger vote shares are more likely to govern (Figure 11, Panel A), consolidation increases the faction's probability of entering government.

Bans move the faction into government. We estimate Equation (11) with government participation as the outcome and the baseline controls of the vote-share analysis (log GDP per capita, log population, education, and urbanization, each interacted with faction). Appendix Table D.5 reports the estimates, with the baseline in column 3. A ban raises the probability that the banned faction is in government by 8.2 percentage points (standard error 3.3), against a pre-ban rate of 21 percent. Figure 12, Panel A, shows the pre-ban rate and the post-ban rate implied by this estimate.

Figure 11: Banned parties as pariahs



Note. Panel A plots government participation against vote share in the last election before each ban, as local (LOESS) means for banned parties (red, dashed) and the other parties of the same election (black, solid). Observations are at the level of a party in the last pre-ban election, in bans where the banned party contests that election. Panel B plots the mean stated acceptability of each party in government conditional on winning the most votes (1 to 5), with 95 percent confidence intervals; the AfD is shown in red. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.


The estimate is positive in every column and smallest without controls.

Online Appendix Tables G.6, G.7, and G.8 repeat the vote-share robustness tests for government participation, varying the event window, set of bans, faction definitions, vote share sources, democracy indices, and clustering choices. The estimates are not statistically significant in 2 of the 28 alternatives and are never statistically significantly negative. We describe each robustness test in more detail in Online Appendix G.

Survey respondents expect a similar shift in which parties govern. Figure 12, Panel B, plots respondents' expectations of which parties enter government with and without an AfD ban. Respondents expect gains for the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), with smaller gains for the FDP and the BSW. The largest gain goes to the CDU, the largest non-pariah party of the right. The share expecting the center-right parties, the CDU or the FDP, in government rises from 64 percent in an ordinary election to 82 percent under an AfD ban.

Incumbent factions do not gain. Incumbents might ban a rival to strengthen their hold on government. This raises concerns of bans being driven by strategic concerns. We test this by re-estimating Equation (11) for the faction in government before the ban, using both vote share and government participation as outcomes. Appendix Tables D.6 and D.7 show that incumbent factions gain no vote share and in fact become less likely to be in government. Part of this decline is mechanical, since a faction in government can only stay in or leave. When we move each ban to an election year of the same country drawn at random, the estimate averages -0.30, less than half the actual estimate, and the share of the 200 placebo draws at or below the actual estimate is below 0.01 (Appendix Figure D.5).

Figure 12: Government of the banned faction



Note. Panel A plots the share of pre-ban elections in which a party of the banned faction is in government, and that share plus the DiD estimate of Equation (11) with the column-3 control set of Appendix Table D.5 (income, population, education, and urbanization, interacted with faction). The interval on the first bar is that of the pre-ban mean, and the interval on the second bar is that of the DiD estimate, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. Government participation across regime types is in Appendix Figure D.1. Panel B plots the share of respondents expecting each party in government, for an ordinary election and under the counterfactual AfD ban, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Support for a ban. Because parties in the banned faction gain most from a ban, their voters might be expected to support it most. We use our survey data to assess this expectation, because support for a party ban by party affiliation is difficult to measure systematically.

Figure 13, Panel A, plots support for an AfD ban by respondents' stated vote. Overall, 45 percent of respondents support an AfD ban. Support is concentrated among voters of parties farthest from the AfD. Only 1 percent of AfD voters support a ban, and support is systematically higher among voters of parties on the left.

Thus, voters who support a party ban do not support the parties that would gain most from a ban.[40] Figure 13, Panel B, plots each party's expected vote share gain under an AfD ban against support for a ban among its voters. The correlation is negative. The parties whose voters most favor a ban, the Greens, the SPD, and the socialist Die Linke (The Left), gain almost nothing. The BSW, whose stated vote share grows by a factor of 4.5, has the voters who support an AfD ban least among the remaining parties.[41]


9 Conclusion

Party bans are common, even in democracies. We assemble global data on party bans and the elections around them, field a survey on the proposed ban of the AfD, and analyze two case studies.

[40] This does not mean that voters do not care about the electoral consequences of party bans. Asked for the most important consequence of a ban, respondents most often name election results and the status of the party, such as the loss of funding and organization (Online Appendix Figure J.7, Panel A). Concerns around mobilization and democratic legitimacy follow as the second and third most important consequences.

[41] The same pattern holds for expected membership in government, where the CDU stands to gain most, but does not have the highest support for a ban.

Figure 13: Survey: who supports an AfD ban



Note. Panel A plots the share of respondents supporting an AfD ban by the party they state they would vote for in an ordinary election, with 95 percent confidence intervals. The AfD is shown in red. Panel B plots, for each remaining party, the share of its voters supporting an AfD ban against the party's stated vote share under the ban relative to the ordinary election (from Figure 9), on a logarithmic axis. The gray line is the least-squares fit. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

We find that in democracies, party bans do not reduce the vote share of the banned faction. Voter demand changes little, banned parties often re-enter, and the parties of the banned faction move toward the banned party's platform.

Despite this, party bans may still be justified on the grounds that they keep extremist movements out of power. Our clearest case study shows evidence on the contrary: in Lower Saxony, a complete ban moved the banned faction into the state government. More systematically, because the banned party is typically a pariah and the neighboring parties need not be, a ban often moves the banned faction into government: its probability of being in government rises by 8.2 percentage points, from 21 percent before the ban.

Nonetheless, in Germany, following the SRP's ban in 1952, the far right disappeared as an independent electoral force for decades, while the parties that retained its voters governed. Whether bans weaken extremist politics in the long run, or simply moves it into established parties, remains an open question. Our results suggest that any authority considering a party ban must also ask where voters of the banned party can go next.

References

Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Werner Krause. 2020. "The Causal Effect of Radical Right Success on Mainstream Parties' Policy Positions: A Regression Discontinuity Approach." *British Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 829–847.

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 127 (1): 47–100.

Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. "Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976–1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 513–529.

Arenas, Andreu. 2021. "Party Bans: Deterrence or Backlash? Evidence from the Basque Country." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 16 (3): 325–358.

Art, David. 2007. "Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria." *Party Politics* 13 (3): 331–349.

Bale, Tim. 2007. "Are Bans on Political Parties Bound to Turn Out Badly? A Comparative Investigation of Three "Intolerant" Democracies: Turkey, Spain, and Belgium." *Comparative European Politics* 5 (2): 141–157.

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 1181–1206.

Bernatskyi, Bohdan. 2024. "Why and When Democracies Ban Political Parties: A Classification of Democratic State Orientations to Party Bans." *Comparative European Politics* 22 (6): 754–791.

Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium." *Econometrica* 63 (4): 841–890.

Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (1): 85–114.

Bogaards, Matthijs. 2010. "Ethnic Party Bans and Institutional Engineering in Nigeria." *Democratization* 17 (4): 730–749.

Bourne, Angela. 2015. "Why Ban Batasuna? Terrorism, Political Parties and Democracy." *Comparative European Politics* 13 (3): 325–344.

———. 2018. *Democratic Dilemmas: Why Democracies Ban Political Parties.* London: Routledge.

Bourne, Angela, and John Veugelers. 2022. "Militant Democracy and Successors to Authoritarian Ruling Parties in Post-1945 West Germany and Italy." *Democratization* 29 (4): 736–753.

Bourne, Angela K., and Fernando Casal Bértoa. 2017. "Mapping "Militant Democracy": Variation in Party Ban Practices in European Democracies (1945–2015)." *European Constitutional Law Review* 13 (2): 221–247.

Brems, Eva. 2006. "Belgium: The Vlaams Blok Political Party Convicted Indirectly of Racism." *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 4 (4): 702–711.

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Georgy Egorov, and Stefano Fiorin. 2020. "From Extreme to Mainstream: The Erosion of Social Norms." *American Economic Review* 110 (11): 3522–3548.

Cantoni, Davide, Felix Hagemeister, and Mark Westcott. 2019. "Persistence and Activation of Right-Wing Political Ideology." Discussion Paper 143. CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

Capoccia, Giovanni. 2005. *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———. 2013. "Militant Democracy: The Institutional Bases of Democratic Self-Preservation." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 9 (1): 207–226.

Casal Bértoa, Fernando, and Angela Bourne. 2017. "Prescribing Democracy? Party Proscription and Party System Stability in Germany, Spain and Turkey." *European Journal of Political Research* 56 (2): 440–465.

Chou, Winston, Rafaela Dancygier, Naoki Egami, and Amaney A. Jamal. 2021. "Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting." *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (12): 2226–2260.

Conley, Timothy G. 1999. "GMM Estimation with Cross Sectional Dependence." *Journal of Econometrics* 92 (1): 1–45.

Conlon, Christopher, and Julie Holland Mortimer. 2021. "Empirical Properties of Diversion Ratios." *RAND Journal of Economics* 52 (4): 693–726.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, et al. 2024. *V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v14.* Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Deutscher Bundestag. 2024. *Antrag auf Entscheidung des Deutschen Bundestages über die Einleitung eines Verfahrens zur Feststellung der Verfassungswidrigkeit der "Alternative für Deutschland".* Drucksache 20/13750, November 13, 2024.

Diermeier, Daniel, Hulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo. 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation." *Econometrica* 71 (1): 27–70.

Döring, Holger, and Sven Regel. 2019. "Party Facts: A Database of Political Parties Worldwide." *Party Politics* 25 (2): 97–109.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper / Row.

Downs, William M. 2001. "Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats." *West European Politics* 24 (3): 23–42.

Ellger, Fabio, and Heike Klüver. 2024. "Adopting Restriction: How Coalition Governments Respond to Radical Right Parties." *West European Politics*, 1–33.

Erk, Jan. 2005. "From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself." *West European Politics* 28 (3): 493–502.

Feddersen, Timothy J., Itai Sened, and Stephen G. Wright. 1990. "Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (4): 1005–1016.

Finkbeiner, Florian, Katharina Trittel, and Lars Geiges. 2019. *Rechtsradikalismus in Niedersachsen: Akteure, Entwicklungen und lokaler Umgang.* Bielefeld: transcript.

Fryer, Roland G., and Steven D. Levitt. 2004. "The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (3): 767–805.

Gamson, William A. 1961. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review* 26 (3): 373–382.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geys, Benny, Bruno Heyndels, and Jan Vermeir. 2006. "Explaining the Formation of Minimal Coalitions: Anti-System Parties and Anti-Pact Rules." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (6): 957–984.

Haerpfer, Christian, Ronald Inglehart, Alejandro Moreno, et al. 2022. *World Values Survey Time-Series (1981–2022) Cross-National Data-Set.* JD Systems Institute and WVSA Secretariat.

Hansen, Henning. 2007. *Die Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP): Aufstieg und Scheitern einer rechtsextremen Partei.* Düsseldorf: Droste.

Heinze, Anna-Sophie. 2018. "Strategies of Mainstream Parties towards their Right-Wing Populist Challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in Comparison." *West European Politics* 41 (2): 287–309.

Herrmann, Michael, and Holger Döring. 2023. "Party Positions from Wikipedia Classifications of Party Ideology." *Political Analysis* 31 (1): 22–41.

Hobbs, William R., and Margaret E. Roberts. 2018. "How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information." *American Political Science Review* 112 (3): 621–636.

Invernizzi Accetti, Carlo, and Ian Zuckerman. 2017. "What's Wrong with Militant Democracy?" *Political Studies* 65 (1_suppl): 182–199.

Issacharoff, Samuel. 2007. "Fragile Democracies." *Harvard Law Review* 120 (6): 1405–1467.

Jacobs, Laura, and Jean-Benoit Pilet. 2025. "To Rule or Not to Rule? An Experimental Study of the Electoral Ramifications of Claims to (Not) Rule with Radical Right Populist Parties." *Party Politics* 31 (6): 977–989.

Jacobs, Laura, and Joost van Spanje. 2020. "Prosecuted, yet Popular? Hate Speech Prosecution of Anti-Immigration Politicians in the News and Electoral Support." *Comparative European Politics* 18 (6): 899–924.

Jolly, Seth, Ryan Bakker, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2022. "Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2019." *Electoral Studies* 75:102420.

Kelemen, R. Daniel, Jonathan B. Slapin, Michele Fenzl, and Pit Rieger. 2025. "Out of Sight Out of Mind? Voter Attitudes about Cooperation with Radical Parties in Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 32 (1): 104–127.

Kim, Mi-son, and Frederick Solt. 2017. "The Dynamics of Party Relabeling: Why Do Parties Change Names?" *Party Politics* 23 (4): 437–447.

Kirshner, Alexander S. 2014. *A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combatting Political Extremism.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Klüver, Heike, and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2016. "Who Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue Attention." *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 633–654.

Kogacioglu, Dicle. 2004. "Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving Political Parties in Turkey." *Law & Society Review* 38 (3): 433–462.

Koninklijke Vlaamsche Academie. 1902. *Lijst der in Zuid-Nederland meest gebruikelijke voornamen.* Gent: A. Siffer.

Krause, Werner, Denis Cohen, and Tarik Abou-Chadi. 2023. "Does Accommodation Work? Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties." *Political Science Research and Methods* 11 (1): 172–179.

Lange, Sarah L. de. 2012. "New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties." *Political Studies* 60 (4): 899–918.

Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lehmann, Pola, Simon Franzmann, Denise Al-Gaddooa, et al. 2024. *The Manifesto Data Collection (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Version 2024a.* Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.

Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. *How Democracies Die.* New York: Crown.

Loewenstein, Karl. 1937. "Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I." *American Political Science Review* 31 (3): 417–432.

Lublin, David, and Matthew Wright. 2014. "Don't Start the Party: Assessing the Electoral Effect of Legal Provisions Impeding Ethnoregional Parties." *Election Law Journal* 13 (2): 277–287.

Lührmann, Anna, Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, et al. 2024. *Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V–Party) Dataset.* Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malkopoulou, Anthoula, and Ludvig Norman. 2018. "Three Models of Democratic Self-Defence: Militant Democracy and Its Alternatives." *Political Studies* 66 (2): 442–458.

Marley, Anthony A. J. 1965. "The Relation between the Discard and Regularity Conditions for Choice Probabilities." *Journal of Mathematical Psychology* 2 (2): 242–253.

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted Robert Gurr. 2020. *Polity5: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2018.* Center for Systemic Peace.

Martin, Lanny W., and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1): 33–50.

Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. "Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 347–359.

Minkenberg, Michael. 2006. "Repression and Reaction: Militant Democracy and the Radical Right in Germany and France." *Patterns of Prejudice* 40 (1): 25–44.

Molier, Gelijn, and Bastiaan Rijpkema. 2018. "Germany's New Militant Democracy Regime: National Democratic Party II and the German Federal Constitutional Court's "Potentiality" Criterion for Party Bans." *European Constitutional Law Review* 14 (2): 394–409.

Mudde, Cas. 2004. "De (non-)transformatie van Vlaams Blok naar Vlaams Belang." *Samenleving en Politiek* 11 (10): 16–22.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. "Protecting Popular Self-Government from the People? New Normative Perspectives on Militant Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:249–265.

Osborne, Martin J., and Al Slivinski. 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111 (1): 65–96.

Palfrey, Thomas R. 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry." *Review of Economic Studies* 51 (1): 139–156.

Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. "Democratisation and Growth." *Economic Journal* 118 (532): 1520–1551.

Pauwels, Teun. 2011. "Le Vlaams Belang." In *Les partis politiques en Belgique,* edited by Pascal Delwit, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Emilie van Haute, 219–234. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

Pons, Vincent, and Clémence Tricaud. 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates." *Econometrica* 86 (5): 1621–1649.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Lucan A. Way. 2023. "Censorship and the Impact of Repression on Dissent." *American Journal of Political Science* 67 (2): 456–471.

Raad van State. 2006. *Bericht voorgeschreven bij artikel 15ter van de wet van 4 juli 1989: verzoek tot inhouding van de dotatie van de politieke partij VLAAMS BLOK, thans VLAAMS BELANG (zaak G/A.173.074/g-91).* Belgisch Staatsblad, 2 June 2006.

Spanje, Joost van. 2010. "Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties' Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe." *Party Politics* 16 (5): 563–586.

Spanje, Joost van, and Nan Dirk de Graaf. 2018. "How Established Parties Reduce Other Parties' Electoral Support: The Strategy of Parroting the Pariah." *West European Politics* 41 (1): 1–27.

Spanje, Joost van, and Claes de Vreese. 2015. "The Good, the Bad and the Voter: The Impact of Hate Speech Prosecution of a Politician on Electoral Support for His Party." *Party Politics* 21 (1): 115–130.

Spoon, Jae-Jae, and Heike Klüver. 2019. "Party Convergence and Vote Switching: Explaining Mainstream Party Decline across Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 58 (4): 1021–1042.

———. 2020. "Responding to Far Right Challengers: Does Accommodation Pay Off?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 27 (2): 273–291.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Trittel, Günter J. 1995. "Die Sozialistische Reichspartei als Niedersächsische Regionalpartei." In *Rechtsradikalismus in der politischen Kultur der Nachkriegszeit: Die verzögerte Normalisierung in Niedersachsen,* edited by Bernd Weisbrod, 67–85. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.

Twist, Kimberly A. 2019. *Partnering with Extremists: Coalitions between Mainstream and Far-Right Parties in Western Europe.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Valentim, Vicente. 2021. "Parliamentary Representation and the Normalization of Radical Right Support." *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (14): 2475–2511.

———. 2024. *The Normalization of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

van Spanje, Joost, and Wouter van der Brug. 2007. "The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-Immigration Parties and its Effect on their Ideological Positions." *West European Politics* 30 (5): 1022–1040.

Verstraete, Tom. 2005. "Van Blok naar Belang: van rots in de branding naar zinkend schip?" *Samenleving en Politiek* 12 (4).

ZDFheute. 2026. *Merz bleibt skeptisch bei AfD-Verbotsverfahren.* ZDF, September 10, 2026.

Zeller, Michael C. 2026. "Pragmatic rather than Principled – Organisational Bans in Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 65 (2): 650–673.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ziblatt, Daniel, Hanno Hilbig, and Daniel Bischof. 2024. "Wealth of Tongues: Why Peripheral Regions Vote for the Radical Right in Germany." *American Political Science Review* 118 (3): 1480–1496.

A Bans in Autocracies and Mass Bans


In this appendix, we provide some facts about party bans in autocracies and mass bans.

Party bans in autocracies differ from those in democracies in purpose and consequences. Mass bans are concentrated in autocracies: 42 percent of bans in autocratic country-years are mass bans, compared to 1 percent in democratic ones. Our review of autocratic mass bans suggests that they typically occur when an autocrat seizes or consolidates power. Egypt dissolved all parties in 1953 after the Free Officers took power, and Chile banned leftist parties after its 1973 coup. Mass bans sometimes mark the end of electoral competition. After a mass ban in a non-democracy, no election follows within ten years 14 percent of the time. In democracies, no election follows a mass ban 0 percent of the time. Our review suggests that democratic mass bans typically target multiple extreme parties simultaneously (e.g., Ukraine's bans of numerous Russia-aligned parties in the last decade), with electoral competition continuing in subsequent years.

Single-party bans also differ materially across regime types. Figure A.1 summarizes these contrasts. Panel A shows that banned parties are slightly less prevalent relative to never-banned parties in democracies, but the difference is not large. Panel B shows that even after single-party bans, no election follows 8 percent of the time in autocracies, compared to 0 percent in democracies. Autocratic bans may be especially endogenous because governments often impose them for strategic political purposes. Only 15 percent of bans in non-democracies are decreed by a court, compared to 52 percent in democracies. Autocracies may also strategically select which opposition parties remain legal. The literature emphasizes that autocracies tolerate small or co-opted parties because they divide challengers and lend legitimacy (Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005; Svolik, 2012).

Bans in autocracies often contribute to regime construction, and their coincidence with regime change confounds analysis of the bans themselves. Elections are often not free or fair, with voters suppressed, ballots stuffed, or outcomes otherwise manipulated. Party bans in autocracies and mass bans therefore fall outside this paper's analytical framework.

Figure A.1: Bans and party competition across regime types



Note. Panel A plots the share of banned and never-banned parties in democratic (Polity score of 8 or higher) and non-democratic country-years. Panel B plots the share of bans followed by no election in the same country within ten years, by regime type at the ban year and by mass versus single-party ban, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on binomial standard errors; bans within ten years of the end of the election panel are excluded. Observations are at the level of a party-election (Panel A) and a ban (Panel B).

B Global Data

This appendix describes election coding around each ban, the construction of the estimation sample, and text-based platform measures. It concludes with descriptive statistics on banned parties.

B.1 The Election Record around Each Ban

Conventional data sources on election results are missing data required for our analysis. Many parties, including banned parties, empirically have small vote shares (Figure 1, Panel C), but databases such as V-Party only list parties gaining at least 5 percent of the vote.

We therefore manually code each ban's election record from national election results. For each ban, coders record the last national legislative election before the ban took effect,[42] whether the banned party ran, and its share of valid votes. Coders also record the first national legislative election after the ban, the party representing the banned party in that election (if any), and its vote share. For parties on joint lists, coders record the list's vote share, which we assign to the party only if its candidates constituted the entire list. Parties verified not to have run because they were founded later, boycotted, operated clandestinely, or were already illegal receive a vote share of zero. Unavailable vote shares remain missing.


B.2 From the Ban Database to the Estimation Sample

Appendix Figure B.1 displays the 1,850 bans since 1900 through successive sample restrictions. Most bans are excluded because no national election occurred in a democratic country-year within ten years of the ban. Most exclusions involve bans under autocracies. Of the 778 bans meeting both criteria, 508 have a faction for the banned party and an observed faction vote.

For parties without a measured position, we code factions from party histories in one faction file. A code never overrides a measured position. The first codes come by hand from the ban coding and the election record of each ban. Large language models code the remaining parties as blind coders: each coder receives packets of parties with their country, election years, vote shares, and ban years, without any existing code, and places each party in a fine-grained faction or marks it as outside the left-right scale. In the first round, two coders from different vendors (Claude and ChatGPT) coded the same parties independently, and a third code resolved disagreements by majority. Later rounds use one coder (ChatGPT), searching the web for each party and re-coding low-confidence codes with the results and main rivals of the party's elections. As a calibration, 150 parties with a measured position entered the packets blind; the coder matched the measured bloc for 94 of the 134 it placed on the left-right scale, more often for left and right parties than for center parties. The coded factions cover 508 of the 778 bans. The main estimates use the measured positions and the codes of the blind coders. They leave out the first codes from the ban coding and the election record, which coders assigned per ban rather than per party. Column 3 of Online Appendix Tables G.3 and G.7 uses only the measured positions.

[42] This includes an election in the ban year if the election preceded the ban.

Figure B.1: Sample construction




Note. Each bar counts the bans, and the countries they fall in, that pass the rule on its left and all rules above it; bar widths are proportional to the square root of the count. The right column gives the bans each rule drops. Democratic country-years are country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. Observations are at the level of a ban.

B.3 Descriptives of Banned Parties


Banned parties contest more elections than never-banned parties (Appendix Figure B.2) and lie closer to the ideological extremes (Appendix Figure B.4). Appendix Figure B.3 plots party positions and faction cutpoints. Appendix Table B.1 reports summary statistics for the ban panel and estimation sample.

Figure B.2: Number of elections contested, banned and never-banned parties



Note. This figure plots the distribution of the number of elections contested by banned and never-banned parties, top-coded at 20. Observations are at the level of a party.

Figure B.3: Party positions and the faction classification




Note. Distribution of published party positions (Herrmann and Döring, 2023) with the cutpoints defining the three factions (bold lines) and seven fine-grained factions (dashed lines). Labeled parties mark recognizable members of each faction; the Vlaams Blok and its successor Vlaams Belang are the parties of the Belgian case. Parties without a published position are classified from the ideology tags on their Wikipedia pages (Section 4.1). Observations are at the level of a party.

Table B.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	Enters as
Panel A: Bans since 1900						
Mass Ban	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00	1,850	(0/1)
Incomplete Ban	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00	562	(0/1)
Decreed by a Court	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00	1,587	(0/1)
Panel B: Estimation sample: bans						
Banned Party Vote Share Before the Ban	6.97	16.74	0.00	99.90	508	(share)
Panel C: Estimation sample: faction-elections						
Leave-Out Vote Share	29.24	20.44	0.00	100.00	5,043	(share)
Government Participation	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00	5,043	(0/1)
Banned Faction	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	5,043	(0/1)
Post-Ban	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	5,043	(0/1)
Panel D: Estimation sample: controls						
Log GDP per Capita	2.14	0.79	0.10	3.81	5,037	(index)
Log Population	7.55	1.46	3.46	10.91	5,037	(index)
Average Years of Education	7.21	2.79	1.31	13.00	5,037	(index)
Urbanization Rate	0.33	0.11	0.08	0.83	5,037	(share)

Figure B.4: Extremeness of banned and never-banned parties



Note. Mean extremeness of banned and never-banned parties on the continuous party positions, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors of the mean. Panel A plots the absolute distance to the center of the position scale, one observation per party. Panel B plots the absolute distance to the mean position of the parties competing in the same election, Panel C the absolute distance to the mean position across the country's other election years, and Panel D the probability of being the most extreme party of the election (the largest distance to the election mean). Observations are at the level of a party-election in Panels B to D. The sample comprises canonical election rows with a published or imputed position.

C Parties Named in the Paper

Appendix Table C.1 lists the parties of the two case studies and the survey with their abbreviations, English names, and positions on a cultural and an economic dimension.

Table C.1: Parties named in the paper

Party	Abbr.	English name	Cultural position	Economic position
A: Belgium, ban of 2004				
Vlaams Blok	VB	Flemish Bloc	Far right; Flemish nationalist; restrictive on immigration	Right; welfare restricted to natives
Vlaams Belang	VB	Flemish Interest	Successor of the Vlaams Blok; same positions	Same as Vlaams Blok
B: West Germany and Lower Saxony, ban of 1952				
Sozialistische Reichspartei	SRP	Socialist Reich Party	Neo-Nazi; antidemocratic	Nationalist
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei	NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party)	Predecessor model of the SRP	–
Deutsche Partei	DP	German Party	National-conservative; far right	Market-oriented
Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten	BHE	Bloc of Expellees and Disenfranchised	Interests of expellees from the former eastern territories	Redistribution to expellees
Christlich Demokratische Union	CDU	Christian Democratic Union	Christian-conservative; center right	Social market economy
Freie Demokratische Partei	FDP	Free Democratic Party	Liberal	Market-liberal
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany	Center left	Redistributive; welfare state
C: Germany, survey of 2026				
Alternative für Deutschland	AfD	Alternative for Germany	Far right; restrictive on immigration	Market-oriented
Christlich Demokratische Union	CDU	Christian Democratic Union	Center right; moderately restrictive on immigration	Market-oriented
Freie Demokratische Partei	FDP	Free Democratic Party	Liberal	Market-liberal
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany	Center left; socially liberal	Redistributive
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Greens	Alliance 90/The Greens	Progressive; open to immigration	Center left; environmental
Die Linke	–	The Left	Progressive	Socialist; strongly redistributive
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht	BSW	Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance	Restrictive on immigration; culturally conservative	Left; redistributive
D: Other German parties named				
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands	KPD	Communist Party of Germany	Far left; banned in 1956	Socialist planned economy
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany	Neo-Nazi; aims ruled unconstitutional in 2017	Nationalist

Note. Positions summarize the program of each party in the period studied, on a cultural dimension (immigration and national identity) and an economic dimension (redistribution and markets). They describe the parties for the reader and do not enter the analysis. The survey placements of the German parties on immigration and a wealth tax are in Online Appendix Figure J.3.

D Global Estimates

This appendix presents the regression tables underlying the global results, including control columns, and additional global exhibits on voter demand, supply margins, and government (Sections 5, 7, and 8).

D.1 Vote Share and Retention

Column 3 of Appendix Table D.1 reports the baseline difference-in-differences estimate from Section 5. Appendix Table D.2 adds the same controls to the retention regression.

Table D.1: Party bans and faction vote shares

	Leave-Out Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	3.86***	4.64***	4.82***	4.29***
	(0.98)	(1.05)	(0.99)	(0.96)
R^2	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.86
Observations	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695
Outcome Mean	29.24	29.24	29.24	29.24
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The sample comprises elections within ten years of a ban in the estimation sample, in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the faction, in percent. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. All specifications include ban-by-faction and ban-by-election fixed effects. Column 2 adds log population; column 3 log GDP per capita, average years of education, and the urbanization rate; and column 4 international and internal armed conflict, each interacted with faction. The outcome mean is taken over all observations of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

D.2 Voter Demand


Backlash and mobilization. A ban could raise support for the banned party by generating sympathy or increasing the salience of its issues. In Figure 8, Panel B, more respondents expect a ban to make their attitude toward the AfD more favorable than less favorable. This expectation is concentrated among AfD voters: 41 percent expect a more favorable attitude, compared with 10 percent of other respondents (Online Appendix Figure J.1). Such backlash would strengthen substitution toward the banned faction. The literature suggests these effects are small: prosecuting a Dutch politician for hate speech increased his party's support by a few percentage points (Spanje and Vreese, 2015), and studies of party bans find no general increase in the popularity of the banned cause (Bale, 2007; Arenas, 2021).

Table D.2: Retention slope with controls

	Leave-Out Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Ban × Banned Party Vote Share Before the Ban	1.02***	0.97***	0.98***	0.94***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
R^2	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.93
Observations	438	438	438	438
Outcome Mean	34.85	34.85	34.85	34.85
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Post FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election of the banned faction. The sample is the retention sample of Figure 5, Panel A: the last election before and the first election after each ban of the estimation sample, in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the banned faction, in percent. The treatment is the banned party's pre-ban vote share interacted with an indicator for the election after the ban, as in Equation (10). All specifications include ban and period fixed effects; the control sets across columns are those of Appendix Table D.1, each interacted with faction. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.


Figure D.1: Retention and government participation by regime type



Note. Panel A plots the retention coefficient of Equation (10) in samples restricted to election years at or above a minimum V-Dem electoral democracy index, from 0 to the cut of 0.55 in our democracy rule; the dashed line marks full retention. Panel B plots the government DiD of Equation (11) with the controls in the same samples; the dashed line marks no change. Estimates are shown with 95 percent confidence intervals (shaded bands). Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level.

Backlash could also mobilize voters. In our global data, turnout changes little after bans: the within-ban change from pre-ban to post-ban elections is -1.2 percentage points (standard error 0.4), relative to a pre-ban mean of 75 percent. In the survey, the turnout intentions of the voters of other parties fall far less under a ban than those of AfD voters (Online Appendix Table J.1, Online Appendix Figure J.4, Panel A). AfD voters state a lower intention to vote: 54 percent under a ban against 98 percent in an ordinary election, a paired change of 44 percentage points (standard error 4). Stated support through donations and volunteering follows the same pattern: AfD voters show the largest changes in stated behavior (Online Appendix Figure J.4, Panel B), and they are less likely to support their party following a ban. This suggests that backlash does not drive the

Figure D.2: Voter ideology around bans, robustness



Note. Robustness to Figure 8, Panel A. Panel B restricts Panel A of that figure to the 20,679 respondents whose predicted ideology lies in the bottom or top quintile of their country. Panel A adds the broader covariate set to the pre-ban prediction: health, religion and religious upbringing, language, immigrant status, marital status, children, living with a parent, education, employment, occupation, chief wage earner, savings, social class, income, region, settlement size, and ethnic group.

vote retention results.

D.3 Entry and Platforms


Appendix Figure D.3 decomposes incomplete bans by the banned party's route of return. Appendix Tables D.3 and D.4 report the platform estimates from Section 7.3 with controls, and Appendix Figure D.4 compares them with benchmarks.

Table D.3: Manifesto similarity to the banned party, all remaining parties

	Distinctiveness			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Ban	0.07***	0.15***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
Observations	153,863	153,313	153,313	153,313
Outcome Mean	3.19	3.19	3.19	3.19
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict

Note. Observations are at the level of a bigram in the manifesto of a remaining party in an election, for the bigrams of the pre-ban manifesto of the banned party, weighted by the count of the bigram. The dependent variable is the distinctiveness of the bigram for the banned party, divided by the pre-ban gap to the banned party, as defined in Online Appendix F. The treatment is an indicator for the elections after the ban (Equation (12)). All specifications include ban-by-faction fixed effects. Column 2 adds log population; column 3 log GDP per capita, average years of education, and the urbanization rate; and column 4 international and internal armed conflict, each interacted with faction. The outcome mean is taken over all observations of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure D.3: Incomplete bans decomposed




Note. Share of incomplete bans among single-party bans in the main panel, decomposed into mutually exclusive routes: the banned party re-entered as a successor party; merged into an existing party (and did not regroup); or continued only in exile (and neither). The three routes sum to the incomplete share. Observations are at the level of a ban.

Table D.4: Manifesto similarity to the banned party, interaction

	Distinctiveness			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.07***	0.19***	0.13***	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Observations	153,952	153,402	153,402	153,402
Outcome Mean	3.10	3.10	3.10	3.10
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Post FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict

Note. Observations are at the level of a bigram in the manifesto of a party in an election, for the bigrams of the pre-ban manifesto of the banned party, weighted by the count of the bigram. The dependent variable is the distinctiveness of the bigram for the banned party, divided by the pre-ban gap to the banned party, as defined in Online Appendix F. The treatment is an indicator for parties of the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. All specifications include ban-by-faction and ban-by-period fixed effects. Column 2 adds log population; column 3 log GDP per capita, average years of education, and the urbanization rate; and column 4 international and internal armed conflict, each interacted with faction. The outcome mean is taken over all observations of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure D.4: Platform movement against its benchmarks, all sources



Note. The movement of all remaining parties (Figure 10, Panel B) and the movement of the banned faction relative to the other parties, for all four sources, with two additions. Lower Saxony speech: the same estimates on parliamentary-speech similarity to the SRP, standard errors clustered by n-gram, matching Online Appendix Table H.5. Belgium: no estimate (hollow marker). The global manifesto coefficient uses bigram distinctiveness, scaled by the pre-ban gap. Two pre-ban rows report the change in similarity across consecutive pre-ban elections, on the same denominator, weighted by the token mass at both endpoints and clustered by ban: the mean signed change toward the banned party (drift) and the mean absolute change. They use the parties of the estimate in each panel: all remaining parties in Panel A and the parties of the banned faction in Panel B. The pre-ban rows use only bans with multiple pre-ban elections in the manifesto corpus. The case rows have no such benchmark: their pre-periods hold a single election (Belgium, Lower Saxony) or a stated expectation (survey). Estimates are shown with 95 percent confidence intervals (whiskers).

D.4 Government

Appendix Table D.5 reports the government estimates of Section 8. Appendix Tables D.6 and D.7 re-estimate the specification for the factions in government before the ban. Government participation in the last election before any date predicts leaving government after it, so the government estimate of Appendix Table D.7 is negative even without a ban. Appendix Figure D.5 benchmarks it against placebo ban years: each draw moves every ban to an election year of its country more than ten years from any ban, counts the placebo election as the first election after the ban, and re-estimates column 3.

Table D.5: Party bans and government participation

	Government Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.04	0.05	0.08**	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.70
Observations	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695
Outcome Mean	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The sample comprises elections within ten years of a ban in the estimation sample, in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The dependent variable is an indicator for a party of the faction in government, as defined in Section 4.1. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. All specifications include ban-by-faction and ban-by-election fixed effects. Column 2 adds log population; column 3 log GDP per capita, average years of education, and the urbanization rate; and column 4 international and internal armed conflict, each interacted with faction. The outcome mean is taken over all observations of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table D.6: Pre-ban government factions: vote share

	Leave-Out Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-Ban Government Faction × Post-Ban	-5.81***	-5.50***	-6.93***	-5.37***
	(1.38)	(1.37)	(1.36)	(1.42)
R^2	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.86
Observations	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695
Outcome Mean	29.24	29.24	29.24	29.24
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict


Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The sample comprises elections within ten years of a ban in the estimation sample, in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the faction, in percent. The treatment is an indicator for a faction in government after the last election before the ban, interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. All specifications include ban-by-faction and ban-by-election fixed effects. Column 2 adds log population; column 3 log GDP per capita, average years of education, and the urbanization rate; and column 4 international and internal armed conflict, each interacted with faction. The outcome mean is taken over all observations of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table D.7: Pre-ban government factions: government participation

	Government Participation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-Ban Government Faction × Post-Ban	-0.63***	-0.64***	-0.69***	-0.54***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
R^2	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.72
Observations	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695
Outcome Mean	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls × Faction	None	log(Pop)	+Econ	+Conflict

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The sample comprises elections within ten years of a ban in the estimation sample, in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The dependent variable is an indicator for a party of the faction in government. The treatment is an indicator for a faction in government after the last election before the ban, interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. All specifications include ban-by-faction and ban-by-election fixed effects. Column 2 adds log population; column 3 log GDP per capita, average years of education, and the urbanization rate; and column 4 international and internal armed conflict, each interacted with faction. The outcome mean is taken over all observations of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure D.5: Pre-ban government factions: placebo ban years



Note. Distribution of the column-3 estimate of Appendix Table D.7 across 200 draws. Each draw moves every ban to an election year of its country drawn at random among those more than ten years from any ban of the country, counts the placebo election as the first election after the ban, and recomputes the factions in government in the last election before it. The dashed line marks the actual estimate.

E Model Derivations and Proofs

This appendix supplies the mathematical details for Section 3. Sums over $j \neq b$ run over the remaining parties $\mathcal{P} \setminus \{b\}$ and exclude the outside option. We assume $T^- - v_b^- > 0$, so the prior leave-out mean is defined. A tilde denotes the election after a complete ban with platforms fixed at $\mathbf{x}_{-b}^-$.

E.1 Prior-election equilibrium

The main text takes as given a pure-strategy prior equilibrium in which platforms have the same ordering as ideal points. Standard sufficient conditions for existence are compact convex platform sets, continuity of payoffs in all platforms, and quasi-concavity in each party's own platform.

Strong ideological motives provide a sufficient condition for ordering. Suppose $C_j(x_j - I_j) = \kappa_j c_j(x_j - I_j)$, $c_j'' \geq \underline{c} > 0$, and the absolute marginal electoral return $|\partial G_j(s_j(\mathbf{x}), A)/\partial x_j|$ is bounded by M. Every interior best response then satisfies

$$|x_j - I_j| \leq \frac{M}{\kappa_j \underline{c}}. \tag{13}$$

If this bound is smaller than one-half of the smallest adjacent ideal-point gap for every party, platforms will be ordered the same as ideal points. The proof follows immediately from the first-order condition and the mean value theorem. We note that these conditions are sufficient, not necessary; we assume that these conditions or similar ones apply, satisfying the ordered equilibrium stated in the main text.

E.2 The three-party spatial model

To make the ordered-platform assumption completely explicit, parties in the three-party model may be understood as choosing from compact, pairwise disjoint intervals $\mathcal{X}_L < \mathcal{X}_R < \mathcal{X}_X$ containing their ideal points, with every displayed optimum in the interior. Equivalently, ideological costs outside these intervals can be made sufficiently steep that crossing is never optimal: we explicitly characterize sufficient conditions under Online Appendix E.1.

Proposition 1. *Under the assumptions in Section 3.2:*

(i) The prior platforms are given by (5)*.*

(ii) If X is banned and platforms are fixed, (6) *and* (7) *hold.*

(iii) If platforms adjust after the ban, $x_L^+ = x_L^-$ and $x_R^+ = x_R^- - \delta$, where δ is defined in (8)*. Moreover,*

$$\Delta s_R = s_X^- + \frac{\delta}{2} > 0, \qquad \Delta s_L = -\frac{\delta}{2}, \tag{14}$$

$$\overline{x}_{-X}^+ - \overline{x}_{-X}^- = s_X^-\left(x_R^- - \overline{x}_{-X}^-\right) - \delta(1 - x_R^-) - \frac{\delta^2}{2}. \tag{15}$$

Hence O1 and O2 hold strictly, and O3 is equivalent to (9)*.*

Proof. With ordered platforms and uniform voters, the indifference points are $(x_L + x_R)/2$ and $(x_R + x_X)/2$. The prior shares stated in the main text can be directly computed from these. Differentiating the payoff (4) with $\eta_j = 0$ gives

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_L}{\partial x_L} = \frac{g_L}{2} - \kappa_L(x_L - I_L), \quad \frac{\partial \Pi_R}{\partial x_R} = -\kappa_R(x_R - I_R), \quad \frac{\partial \Pi_X}{\partial x_X} = -\frac{g_X}{2} - \kappa_X(x_X - I_X).$$

Strict concavity in each own platform gives the unique interior best responses in (5).

After party X is banned, and fixing platforms, the boundary between L and R remains $(x_L^- + x_R^-)/2$. Thus L retains exactly its old voters, while R receives its own and all of X's former voters, proving (6). Let $S^- = s_L^- + s_R^- = 1 - s_X^-$. Since

$$\overline{x}_{-X}^- = \frac{s_L^- x_L^- + s_R^- x_R^-}{S^-},$$

the fixed-platform post-ban mean is

$$\widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-X} = s_L^- x_L^- + (s_R^- + s_X^-)x_R^- = S^- \overline{x}_{-X}^- + s_X^- x_R^-.$$

Subtracting $\overline{x}_{-X}^-$ gives (7). It is positive because $s_X^- > 0$ and x_R^- is the rightmost platform included in the prior leave-out mean.

With two parties after the ban,

$$s_L = \frac{x_L + x_R}{2}, \qquad s_R = 1 - \frac{x_L + x_R}{2}.$$

The post-ban first-order conditions are

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{g_L}{2} - \kappa_L(x_L - I_L) - \eta_L(x_L - x_L^-) &= 0, \\ -\frac{g_R}{2} - \kappa_R(x_R - I_R) - \eta_R(x_R - x_R^-) &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

The first is solved by $x_L = x_L^-$ because the prior first-order condition gives $\kappa_L(x_L^- - I_L) = g_L/2$. Since $x_R^- = I_R$, the second gives $x_R^+ = x_R^- - g_R/[2(\kappa_R + \eta_R)]$. The new boundary moves left by $\delta/2$, which gives (14).

Let $\widetilde{s}_L = s_L^-$ and $\widetilde{s}_R = s_R^- + s_X^-$. Then $s_L^+ = \widetilde{s}_L - \delta/2$ and $s_R^+ = \widetilde{s}_R + \delta/2$. Hence

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{x}_{-X}^+ &= (\widetilde{s}_L - \delta/2)x_L^- + (\widetilde{s}_R + \delta/2)(x_R^- - \delta) \\ &= \widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-X} + \frac{\delta}{2}(x_R^- - x_L^-) - \widetilde{s}_R\delta - \frac{\delta^2}{2} \\ &= \widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-X} - \delta(1 - x_R^-) - \frac{\delta^2}{2},\end{aligned}$$

where the last equality uses $\widetilde{s}_R = 1 - (x_L^- + x_R^-)/2$. Combining this with (7) proves (15) and the final claims. □

E.3 General model: assumptions and propositions

We now turn to the general model. We do not impose functional forms or distributional assumptions, but instead give conditions for O1–O3 under three scenarios: (1) an incomplete ban, where the party is not banned or re-enters; (2) a complete ban with fixed platforms, which removes b while holding $\mathbf{x}_{-b}^-$ fixed; and (3) a complete ban with endogenous platforms, which lets the remaining parties $\mathcal{P}^+ = \mathcal{P} \setminus \{b\}$ choose a new equilibrium $\mathbf{x}^+$. We note that the complete ban with fixed platforms can be interpreted in two ways: party bans sometimes occur shortly before an election, leaving no time for platforms to move; and legal restrictions are sometimes placed on the positions parties may adopt, especially on positions close to the banned party.

After a complete ban, let $(\widetilde{v}_j, \widetilde{T}, \widetilde{s}_j)$ denote electoral outcomes with platforms fixed at the prior election, $\mathbf{x}_{-b}^-$. The raw electoral support recaptured by party j and the support lost to abstention are

$$R_j = \widetilde{v}_j - v_j^-, \qquad R_0 = v_b^- - \sum_{j \neq b} R_j. \tag{16}$$

The vote-share change for a party decomposes into a fixed-platform component D_j and a campaign component Φ_j:

$$D_j = \widetilde{s}_j - s_j^-, \qquad \Phi_j = s_j^+ - \widetilde{s}_j, \qquad \Delta s_j = D_j + \Phi_j. \tag{17}$$

Assumptions. We discuss four assumptions, which we abbreviate A1 to A4, that deliver O1–O3 across the three scenarios. Not every assumption is needed for each outcome.

Assumption A1 (Regularity)**.** *Holding platforms and party attributes fixed, deleting an alternative cannot reduce the choice probability of any remaining party or the outside option:*

$$A' \subseteq A, \quad j \in A' \cup \{0\} \quad \Longrightarrow \quad q_j(\theta; \mathbf{x}, A') \geq q_j(\theta; \mathbf{x}, A). \tag{18}$$

This is the standard regularity condition in stochastic choice (Marley, 1965). It is implied by a large class of choice models, including deterministic utility maximization and random utility

models with choice-set-invariant latent utilities.[43]

Assumption A2 (Strong proximity)**.** *Suppose $v_b^- > 0$, and let $p_{bk} = R_k / v_b^-$ be the share of b's prior support reallocated to option k, including $p_{b0} = R_0 / v_b^-$. Proximity is sufficiently strong if, for every $j \in \mathcal{O}$,*

$$p_{ba} - p_{bj} > \frac{(v_j^- - v_a^-)_+}{T^-} \, p_{b0}. \tag{19}$$

With full turnout, A2 simply says that a former b-voter is more likely to choose a than any other party. With abstention, it also requires enough of a recapture advantage to offset the mechanical advantage that lower turnout gives to a larger party. Online Appendix E.6 uses distance-sensitive second-choice odds and shows how large the proximity advantage must be for A2 to hold.

Assumption A3 (Platform rigidity)**.** *Electoral payoffs have bounded gradients, vote shares are Lipschitz in the platform profile, and the ideological and switching costs are strongly convex, with combined curvature ρ_j. Platform movement is then bounded and converges uniformly to zero as $\min_j \rho_j \to \infty$.*

We call A3 *sufficiently strong* when ρ_j is large enough, with Online Appendix E.7 giving the exact bounds. A3 requires parties to value staying close to their ideal point, or to face large costs of moving from their prior platform.

Assumption A4 (Right-tilted recapture)**.** *Suppose b is the rightmost party, every other party's prior platform lies left of I_b, every party has positive prior support, and some of b's support is recaptured. With $\pi_j^- = v_j^- / (T^- - v_b^-)$,*

$$\mathrm{Cov}_{\pi^-}\left(x_j^-, \frac{R_j}{v_j^-}\right) > 0. \tag{20}$$

A4 says that parties farther to the right recapture more of b's support relative to their prior size. The leftmost case reverses direction.

We next give three propositions, one per outcome, with sufficient conditions for each outcome to hold; the surrounding subsections prove them, with parts (a) following from the lemma of Online Appendix E.4.

Proposition 2 (Vote-share gain)**.** *Outcome O1 is that the party a gains vote share after the ban.*

(a) Under an incomplete ban, $\mathbf{x}^-$ remains an equilibrium. Selecting this continuation equilibrium, O1 holds with equality.

(b) Under a complete ban with fixed platforms, A1 implies O1. It holds strictly if $R_a > 0$, or if $v_a^- > 0$ and $R_0 > 0$.

(c) Under a complete ban with endogenous platforms, suppose the fixed-platform gain is strict. Under A1 and sufficiently strong A3, O1 continues to hold strictly.

[43] A1 is weaker than IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) used in some random utility models.

Consider first an incomplete ban. All of O1–O3 hold with equality without any of A1–A4: when the party is not banned, nothing changes, and a ban that does not block re-entry does not change electoral outcomes.

Under a complete ban with fixed platforms, removing b cannot cost a raw votes under regularity. Even if some former b-voters abstain, turnout also falls, raising a's conditional vote share even when it recaptures none of them. Endogenous platforms can introduce a countervailing campaign effect, but a strict gain remains when ideological commitments or switching costs keep platform adjustment small.

Proposition 2 implies a necessary condition for a ban to lower the vote of the closest party.

Corollary 1 (When a ban lowers the vote)**.** *Maintaining the continuation-equilibrium selection of Proposition 2(a), the closest party a loses vote share after a ban ($\Delta s_a < 0$) only if*

(i) the ban blocks re-entry (the ban is complete), and

(ii) either voter choice violates regularity (A1), so that removing b lowers the choice probability of a, or platforms respond to the ban and the campaign effect on a is negative ($\Phi_a < 0$).

The corollary follows from parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 and the decomposition $\Delta s_a = D_a + \Phi_a$ in Equation (17). Each of these conditions maps to one of the three freedoms of periods 1–3, as the remark in Section 3 states.

Proposition 3 (Relative vote-share gain)**.** *Outcome O2 is that the party a gains more vote share than any other party after the ban.*

(a) Under an incomplete ban and the continuation equilibrium $\mathbf{x}^-$, O2 holds with equality.

(b) Under a complete ban with fixed platforms, A1 and A2 imply that a gains strictly more vote share than every $j \in \mathcal{O}$.

(c) Under a complete ban with endogenous platforms, A1, A2, and sufficiently strong A3 imply the same strict ranking.

Outcome O2 is stronger than the statement that the closest party receives the most displaced voters. If former b-voters abstain, every remaining party benefits from the smaller turnout denominator, and that benefit is larger for parties with greater prior support; A2 requires a's proximity advantage to dominate this size effect. With endogenous platforms, the same conclusion survives when platform responses are small relative to that strict advantage.

Proposition 4 (Electoral ideology)**.** *Outcome O3 is that the average (vote-weighted) ideology moves toward the banned party's ideal point after a ban. Suppose b is rightmost; the leftmost case is symmetric.*

(a) Under an incomplete ban and the continuation equilibrium $\mathbf{x}^-$, O3 holds with equality.

(b) Under a complete ban with fixed platforms, A1 and A4 imply O3 strictly.

(c) Under a complete ban with endogenous platforms, A1 and A4 imply O3 strictly if the post-ban mean does not overshoot I_b and either

(i) campaign adjustment itself weakly moves the vote-weighted mean toward I_b; or

(ii) A3 is sufficiently strong.

Outcome O3 can arise even without any change in party platforms. When voters choose parties mainly on ideology (A4), the ban reweights votes toward the remaining parties already located nearer to it. Endogenous campaigns add both direct platform movement and further vote-share reweighting; if their net effect points toward b—because the incentive to capture b-voters who may not turn out outweighs the incentive to moderate—they reinforce O3. Even when campaign effects are ambiguous, a strict compositional shift survives whenever platform rigidity makes the campaign response sufficiently small.

E.4 Incomplete bans

Lemma 1. *If b is not banned, or if an observationally equivalent successor re-enters, the prior platform profile $\mathbf{x}^-$ remains a period-2 Nash equilibrium. Under this continuation equilibrium, platforms, raw votes, turnout, and vote shares are unchanged.*

Proof. The active choice set and voter demand are the same as in the prior election. Convexity and $K_j(0) = K_j'(0) = 0$ imply $K_j(z) \geq 0$ for every z. Relative to the prior-election payoff, a deviation in period 2 therefore incurs the additional nonnegative cost $\eta_j K_j(x_j - x_j^-)$, which is zero at x_j^-. Any deviation that was unprofitable before remains unprofitable. Thus $\mathbf{x}^-$ is still an equilibrium. □

Lemma 1 proves part (a) of Propositions 2–4.

E.5 Choice-set deletion and vote shares

Write $S^- = T^- - v_b^- > 0$. Under A1, $R_j \geq 0$ for every survivor and the outside option also weakly gains. Since choice probabilities sum to one before and after deletion,

$$R_0 = \int_\Theta \left[q_0(\theta; \mathbf{x}_{-b}^-, \mathcal{P} \setminus \{b\}) - q_0(\theta; \mathbf{x}^-, \mathcal{P}) \right] dF(\theta) \geq 0, \tag{21}$$

and

$$R + R_0 = v_b^-, \qquad R \equiv \sum_{j \neq b} R_j, \qquad \widetilde{T} = S^- + R = T^- - R_0 > 0. \tag{22}$$

For every survivor j,

$$D_j = \widetilde{s}_j - s_j^- = \frac{T^- R_j + v_j^- R_0}{T^- \widetilde{T}} \geq 0, \tag{23}$$

with a strict inequality if $R_j > 0$, or if $v_j^- > 0$ and $R_0 > 0$. This proves Proposition 2(b).

For any $j \in \mathcal{O}$,

$$D_a - D_j = \frac{T^-(R_a - R_j) + (v_a^- - v_j^-)R_0}{T^-\widetilde{T}}. \tag{24}$$

Under A2, $R_k = v_b^- p_{bk}$ and

$$T^-(p_{ba} - p_{bj}) > (v_j^- - v_a^-)_+ p_{b0} \geq (v_j^- - v_a^-)p_{b0}.$$

Multiplying by $v_b^- > 0$ shows that the numerator in (24) is positive. This proves Proposition 3(b).

E.6 Second choices and primitive proximity conditions

A2 can be connected directly to spatial substitution. Suppose that each voter has choice-set-invariant latent utilities $(U_k)_{k\in\mathcal{P}\cup\{0\}}$ and chooses the available option with highest utility, with ties occurring with probability zero. Conditional on type θ, define

$$\sigma_{bk}(\theta) = \Pr\left(k = \arg\max_{\ell\neq b} U_\ell \;\middle|\; b = \arg\max_{\ell} U_\ell, \theta\right) \tag{25}$$

for remaining parties and the outside option. Also define the distribution of types among prior b-supporters by

$$d\mu_b(\theta) = \frac{q_b(\theta; \mathbf{x}^-, \mathcal{P})}{v_b^-}\, dF(\theta).$$

Choice-set-invariant utility implies regularity and the pointwise identity

$$q_k(\theta; \mathbf{x}_{-b}^-, \mathcal{P} \setminus \{b\}) - q_k(\theta; \mathbf{x}^-, \mathcal{P}) = q_b(\theta; \mathbf{x}^-, \mathcal{P})\sigma_{bk}(\theta).$$

Integrating gives

$$p_{bk} = E_{\mu_b}[\sigma_{bk}(\theta)]. \tag{26}$$

Thus A2 is an average second-choice restriction. Note that own-choice monotonicity in distance is not enough: it does not determine where a voter goes when b is banned.

We next give conditions that characterize the required strength of spatial proximity based voting for A2 to hold. Let $d_k(\theta) = |x_k^- - \theta|$, let h be increasing, and suppose

$$\log\frac{\sigma_{ba}(\theta)}{\sigma_{bj}(\theta)} \geq \lambda\{h(d_j(\theta)) - h(d_a(\theta))\} - \Gamma_{aj}, \qquad \lambda > 0. \tag{27}$$

The parameter λ measures distance sensitivity and Γ_{aj} bounds the nonspatial advantage of j. Let

$$H_r = \{\theta : |\theta - x_b^-| \leq r\}, \qquad \delta_k = |x_k^- - x_b^-|.$$

On H_r, $d_a(\theta) \leq \delta_a + r$ and $d_j(\theta) \geq \delta_j - r$. Hence the proximity margin in this core region is

$$\kappa_{aj} = \lambda\{h(\delta_j - r) - h(\delta_a + r)\} - \Gamma_{aj}. \tag{28}$$

Suppose $\kappa_{aj} > 0$ and $\sigma_{ba} \geq \underline{\sigma} > 0$ on H_r. Then

$$\sigma_{ba} - \sigma_{bj} \geq \alpha_{aj} \equiv (1 - e^{-\kappa_{aj}})\underline{\sigma} > 0 \quad \text{on } H_r. \tag{29}$$

Let $\sigma_{ba} - \sigma_{bj} \geq -\gamma_{aj}$ outside H_r; $\gamma_{aj} = 1$ always works. Finally set

$$\tau_{aj} = \frac{(v_j^- - v_a^-)_+}{T^-}\, p_{b0}.$$

Using (26), A2 holds for this j whenever

$$\mu_b(H_r) > \frac{\gamma_{aj} + \tau_{aj}}{\alpha_{aj} + \gamma_{aj}}. \tag{30}$$

Indeed,

$$p_{ba} - p_{bj} \geq \alpha_{aj}\mu_b(H_r) - \gamma_{aj}[1 - \mu_b(H_r)] > \tau_{aj}.$$

Equations (28)–(30) answer how strong proximity must be: the distance advantage must overcome nonspatial appeal on a sufficiently large share of b's electorate, with an additional margin when abstention would otherwise favor a larger competitor.

For example, under multinomial logit with systematic utility

$$u_k(\theta) = \xi_k - \lambda h(|x_k^- - \theta|),$$

the second-choice odds satisfy (27) with $\Gamma_{aj} = \max\{0, \xi_j - \xi_a\}$. Pointwise dominance on the core therefore follows from

$$\lambda\{h(\delta_j - r) - h(\delta_a + r)\} > \xi_j - \xi_a.$$

With linear distance this is a distance gap multiplied by λ; with quadratic distance it is the corresponding squared-distance gap.

E.7 Campaign adjustment

This subsection supplies the exact meaning of "sufficiently strong" A3. Write

$$\Psi_j(\mathbf{x}, A) = G_j(s_j(\mathbf{x}, A), A).$$

Suppose, for every survivor j:

(i) $|\partial\Psi_j/\partial x_j| \leq M_j$ at the prior and post-ban profiles;

(ii) $C_j'' \geq \underline{c}_j \geq 0$ and $K_j'' \geq \underline{k}_j \geq 0$;

(iii) $\rho_j \equiv \underline{c}_j + \eta_j \underline{k}_j > 0$; and

(iv) post-ban vote shares satisfy

$$|s_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathcal{P}^+) - s_j(\mathbf{y}, \mathcal{P}^+)| \leq \ell_j \|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}\|_\infty. \tag{31}$$

Interior first-order conditions and the mean value theorem give

$$|x_j^+ - x_j^-| \leq \frac{2M_j}{\rho_j}, \qquad \bar{m} \equiv \|\mathbf{x}^+ - \mathbf{x}_{-b}^-\|_\infty \leq \bar{m}^* \equiv \max_{j \neq b} \frac{2M_j}{\rho_j}. \tag{32}$$

To see this, subtract the prior and post-ban first-order conditions. The change in the marginal electoral return is at most $2M_j$ in absolute value, while strong convexity makes the change in the marginal cost have the sign of $x_j^+ - x_j^-$ and absolute value at least $\rho_j |x_j^+ - x_j^-|$.

By (31),

$$|\Phi_j| \leq \ell_j \bar{m}^*. \tag{33}$$

It follows from $\Delta s_j = D_j + \Phi_j$ that the exact sufficient rigidity conditions for Propositions 2(c) and 3(c) are

$$D_a > \ell_a \bar{m}^*, \tag{34}$$

$$D_a - D_j > (\ell_a + \ell_j)\bar{m}^* \quad \text{for every } j \in \mathcal{O}. \tag{35}$$

A1 and the strictness condition in Proposition 2(b) make $D_a > 0$; A1–A2 make every $D_a - D_j > 0$. Because $\bar{m}^* \to 0$ as $\min_j \rho_j \to \infty$, sufficiently large ideological or switching-cost curvature satisfies these inequalities.

E.8 Leave-out ideology

Let

$$S^- = T^- - v_b^-, \qquad \pi_j^- = \frac{v_j^-}{S^-}, \qquad \overline{x}_R = \frac{\sum_{j \neq b} R_j x_j^-}{R}$$

when $R > 0$. At fixed platforms,

$$\widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-b} = \overline{x}_{-b}^- + \underbrace{\frac{R}{S^- + R}(\overline{x}_R - \overline{x}_{-b}^-)}_{D_x}. \tag{36}$$

This follows by writing the numerator of the post-ban mean as $S^- \overline{x}_{-b}^- + R\overline{x}_R$ and its denominator as $S^- + R$.

If every survivor has positive prior support, define $r_j = R_j / v_j^-$. Direct calculation yields

$$\mathrm{Cov}_{\pi^-}(x_j^-, r_j) = \frac{R}{S^-}(\overline{x}_R - \overline{x}_{-b}^-). \tag{37}$$

A4 therefore implies $D_x > 0$. Since both fixed-platform means are convex combinations of re-

maining platforms and hence lie to the left of I_b, this proves Proposition 4(b). The covariance form also explains why absolute recapture is not enough: O3 requires parties on the side of I_b to gain disproportionately relative to their initial size.

With endogenous platforms, add and subtract the fixed-platform mean:

$$\overline{x}^{+}_{-b} - \overline{x}^{-}_{-b} = D_x + \Phi_x, \qquad \Phi_x \equiv \overline{x}^{+}_{-b} - \widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-b}. \tag{38}$$

Because all active post-ban parties continue to compete,

$$\Phi_x = \sum_{j \neq b} s_j^{+}(x_j^{+} - x_j^{-}) + \sum_{j \neq b} (s_j^{+} - \widetilde{s}_j) x_j^{-}. \tag{39}$$

The first term is direct platform movement; the second is campaign-induced reweighting across the old platforms. If $\Phi_x \geq 0$ and the new mean does not overshoot I_b, A4 and (38) prove Proposition 4(c)(i).

For the rigidity result, let

$$w = \max_{j \neq b} x_j^{-} - \min_{j \neq b} x_j^{-}, \qquad H_x = 1 + \frac{w}{2} \sum_{j \neq b} \ell_j.$$

The first term in (39) is at most $\bar{m}^*$ in absolute value. Centering the second term at the midpoint of the remaining prior platforms and using (33) gives

$$|\Phi_x| \leq H_x \bar{m}^*. \tag{40}$$

Thus an exact sufficient version of A3 for O3 is

$$H_x \bar{m}^* < \min\{D_x,\ I_b - \widetilde{\overline{x}}_{-b}\}. \tag{41}$$

The first bound ensures $D_x + \Phi_x > 0$; the second prevents overshooting I_b. Under A4, both quantities on the right are positive, so (41) holds for sufficiently large $\min_j \rho_j$. This proves Proposition 4(c)(ii).

E.9 Extension to factions

Let $\mathcal{F}$ be the remaining members of b's faction and $\mathcal{G}$ another faction. For any set $\mathcal{K}$, define $v^-_{\mathcal{K}} = \sum_{k\in\mathcal{K}} v^-_k$ and define $R_{\mathcal{K}}$, $D_{\mathcal{K}}$, $\Phi_{\mathcal{K}}$, and $\Delta s_{\mathcal{K}}$ analogously. Summing the party-level identities gives

$$\begin{aligned} D_{\mathcal{F}} &= \frac{T^- R_{\mathcal{F}} + v^-_{\mathcal{F}} R_0}{T^- \widetilde{T}}, \\ D_{\mathcal{F}} - D_{\mathcal{G}} &= \frac{T^-(R_{\mathcal{F}} - R_{\mathcal{G}}) + (v^-_{\mathcal{F}} - v^-_{\mathcal{G}})R_0}{T^- \widetilde{T}}, \\ |\Phi_{\mathcal{F}}| &\le \left(\sum_{k\in\mathcal{F}} \ell_k\right) \bar{m}^*. \end{aligned}$$

Accordingly, Propositions 2 and 3 extend by replacing party-level quantities with faction sums. Proposition 4 already averages over all non-banned parties and is unchanged by how parties are grouped.

F Text Analysis: Manifestos and Speech

We measure each party's manifesto or parliamentary speech similarity to the banned party's pre-ban text.

Cleaning. We tokenize each manifesto into unigrams and bigrams and count occurrences within each party-election document. Using the language-specific stopwords-iso lists, we drop n-grams containing a stopword or a component shorter than three characters. For Lower Saxony parliamentary speech (Online Appendix H.2), this rule leaves too few n-grams shared across parties. We therefore drop an n-gram only if every component is a stopword or shorter than three characters and supplement the German list with manually reviewed procedural terms.

Similarity measure. Fix a ban b. The reference corpus pools the banned party's manifestos from the elections in the fifteen years before the ban, and the comparison corpus pools the manifestos of all other parties of the country from the same elections; post-ban manifestos are those from the fifteen years after the ban. For Lower Saxony, the corpora are the speech of the SRP and of all other parliamentary groups in the plenary meetings before the ban. For each n-gram g, let f_g^B denote its relative frequency in the reference corpus and f_g^C its relative frequency in the comparison corpus. The distinctiveness score of g is

$$d_g = \frac{f_g^B}{f_g^B + f_g^C},$$

which equals 1 for n-grams used exclusively by the banned party and 0.5 for n-grams used equally frequently in both corpora (Fryer and Levitt, 2004). Document j's similarity to the banned party is the count-weighted mean score of its n-grams, $\text{sim}_j = \sum_g n_{jg} d_g / \sum_g n_{jg}$. We implement this measure as an n-gram-level regression weighted by counts n_{jg}.

Rescaling. We divide estimated coefficients by the pre-ban platform gap to the banned party to express them as the share of that gap closed. For ban b, the gap is $\text{gap}_b = \overline{\text{sim}}_b^B - \overline{\text{sim}}_b^C$, where $\overline{\text{sim}}_b^B = \sum_g f_g^B d_g$ is the banned party's similarity to itself, the measure's ceiling, and $\overline{\text{sim}}_b^C$ is the comparison group's pre-ban similarity. The comparison group comprises the banned faction for difference-in-differences estimates and all remaining parties for single-difference estimates. We divide coefficients by the average of gap_b across bans, weighted by each ban's pre-ban token count.

G Robustness


The following subsections assess the global estimates across three dimensions, with one table per outcome: sample construction, including placebo dates and event windows (Online Appendix Tables G.1 and G.6), measurement (Online Appendix Tables G.3 and G.7), and estimation and inference (Online Appendix Tables G.5 and G.8). Column headers identify deviations from the main specification. A final subsection examines heterogeneity by ban characteristics (Online Appendix Table G.9).

G.1 Placebo Tests

The global estimates could reflect faction differences that would arise without a ban. We conduct two placebo tests. First, we retain all elections before the actual ban and assign the preceding election as the ban date if it falls within twenty years of the ban (column 1 of Online Appendix Table G.1). Second, we randomly assign each ban to one of the three factions and re-estimate Equation (11) with the controls from column 3 of Appendix Table D.1 across 500 draws (Online Appendix Figure G.1).

The placebo date yields no statistically significant change in the banned faction's leave-out vote share. The randomization p-value, defined as the share of placebo estimates at least as large in absolute value as the actual estimate, is below 0.01 for vote share and below 0.01 for government participation.

Figure G.1: Randomization inference



Note. Distribution of estimates of Equation (11), with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1, when the treated faction is drawn at random from the three factions around each ban, in 500 draws. The dashed lines mark the actual estimates. Left: leave-out vote share in percentage points. Right: government participation.

G.2 Sample Construction

The baseline regressions include all elections within ten years of the ban. Columns 2 and 3 of Online Appendix Table G.1 vary this window to five and fifteen years. Column 4 restricts the post-period to the first election after a ban. Column 5 includes only bans with at least two elections on each side.

Columns 6 to 14 of the same table vary the set of bans. Column 6 excludes bans coded as ambiguous. Column 7 lowers the Polity cut from 8 to the median Polity score, keeping the V-Dem rule, and admits potentially weak democracies. Column 8 defines democracies by a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.7 alone. Columns 9 and 10 restrict the sample to bans decreed by courts and by courts or governments, respectively. These subsets are more plausibly exogenous but reduce statistical power. Column 11 excludes mass bans. Column 12 excludes bans from 1940 to 1945. Column 13 includes only bans in which the banned party itself returns to the ballot within ten years. Column 14 includes the remaining bans.

The vote estimate retains its magnitude and statistical significance with the five- and fifteen-year windows, when the post-period includes only the first election, among bans with at least two elections on each side, and under conservative coding. It is positive in every column except the placebo date.

We also assess the robustness of the retention specification, Equation (10). Online Appendix Table G.2 reports the retention coefficient ρ for the primary democratic sample (Panel A), all country-years (Panel B), and each index of the democracy rule alone (Panels C and D). The slope is 0.41 excluding mass bans and 0.42 excluding bans from 1940 to 1945, compared with 0.42 for all bans. In the main sample (Panel A), the slope remains near one in every subset: without mass bans, without the bans from 1940 to 1945, under conservative coding, and for court bans. The slope also remains near one under each index of the democracy rule alone (Panels C and D). Online Appendix Figure G.2 excludes one country's bans at a time among country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The slope remains close to one regardless of the country excluded.

Table G.1: Robustness: alternative samples, faction vote share

	Leave-Out Vote Share													
	Placebo date	5-year window	15-year window	First post-ban election	Balanced bans	Conservative	q50 polity	High V-Dem	Court bans	Court/gov. bans	No mass bans	Excl. 1940–45	Re-enters	No re-entry
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	-1.09	4.68***	4.45***	3.04***	4.52***	4.45***	4.87***	4.79***	4.26***	5.37***	3.64***	4.84***	10.80***	3.43***
	(1.15)	(0.97)	(0.93)	(1.05)	(1.05)	(1.37)	(1.10)	(1.37)	(1.20)	(1.01)	(1.13)	(1.11)	(2.33)	(1.09)
R^2	0.86	0.90	0.85	0.88	0.87	0.84	0.78	0.92	0.89	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.86
Observations	4,977	2,001	7,002	3,351	2,451	2,850	6,993	1,854	1,659	3,885	3,039	3,897	642	4,053
Bans	483	455	547	477	159	316	759	206	133	385	278	439	61	447
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the faction, in percent. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. Each column estimates Equation (11) with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1; the column headers name the deviation from the main specification, described in Online Appendix G. Columns 1 to 5 vary the placebo date and the event window, and columns 6 to 14 the set of bans (Online Appendix G.2). Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level unless the table states otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table G.2: Robustness: vote retention across ban samples

	All bans	Conservative	No mass bans	Excl. 1940–45	Court bans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Polity score of 8 or above or electoral democracy index of 0.55					
Retention ρ	1.02***	1.06***	1.07***	0.99***	1.10***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Bans	443	275	240	379	114
Panel B: All country-years					
Retention ρ	0.42***	0.41***	0.41***	0.42***	0.58***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.22)
Bans	1086	760	659	991	223
Panel C: Polity score of 8 or above alone					
Retention ρ	1.08***	1.04***	1.08***	1.04***	–
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.15)	
Bans	305	190	201	246	–
Panel D: Electoral democracy index of at least 0.55 alone					
Retention ρ	1.02***	1.15***	1.13***	1.03***	–
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.10)	
Bans	352	214	192	292	–


Note. Each cell estimates Equation (10) on the banned faction in the last election before and the first election after the ban. Panel A uses country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55 (the main sample), Panel B all country-years, Panel C country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above, and Panel D country-years with a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. The bans row counts the bans of each sample; a dash marks a cell without bans whose party ran, and Panels C and D omit court bans. The columns restrict the bans as in Online Appendix Table G.1. All specifications include ban and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level, which here is the ban. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

G.3 Measurement

Online Appendix Table G.3 varies measurement choices. Column 2 divides parties into seven factions (far-left, left, center-left, center, center-right, right, far-right) using cutpoints from Herrmann and Döring (2023), instead of the baseline three. Column 3 uses only measured positions, without the factions coded from party histories (Appendix B.2). Column 4 restricts vote shares and government participation to V-Party sources. Columns 5 and 6 use each index of the baseline democracy rule alone: a Polity score of 8 or above, and a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. Columns 7 and 8 define democracies by the top quartile of V-Dem's liberal democracy index and the top quartile of the average of five V-Dem democracy indices, respectively, instead of the baseline democracy rule. Column 9 also excludes the banned party from the post-ban leave-out vote share, preventing returning parties from contributing to their faction's share. Column 10 restricts government participation to the leading party. The vote estimate is positive and statistically significant throughout.

Online Appendix Table G.4 repeats the estimates comparing the banned faction with other parties using bigrams and unigrams, for global manifestos and Lower Saxony state parliamentary

Figure G.2: Vote retention, dropping one country at a time



Note. Estimates of Equation (10) dropping the bans of one country at a time, with 95 percent confidence intervals. The dashed line marks full retention. The sample comprises the last election before and the first election after each ban, of the bans of the estimation sample, in country-years with a Polity score of 8 or above or a V-Dem electoral democracy index of at least 0.55. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level.

speech. All four estimates are positive and statistically significant.

Table G.3: Robustness: alternative measures, faction vote share

	Leave-Out Vote Share									
	Main	Fine factions	Measured factions	V-Party only	Polity only	V-Dem only	Liberal democracy	Combined index	Strict leave-out	Leading party
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	4.82***	2.72***	5.69***	4.61***	5.09***	4.55***	4.19***	2.90***	2.98***	4.82***
	(0.99)	(0.70)	(1.14)	(1.00)	(1.17)	(1.09)	(1.13)	(1.11)	(0.97)	(0.99)
R^2	0.86	0.86	0.89	0.86	0.84	0.88	0.82	0.86	0.86	0.86
Observations	4,695	10,955	2,958	4,608	3,375	3,501	4,872	4,152	4,695	4,695
Bans	508	508	330	479	362	440	496	468	508	508
SEs	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the faction, in percent. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. Each column estimates Equation (11) with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1; the column headers name the deviation from the main specification, described in Online Appendix G. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level unless the table states otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table G.4: Robustness: unigrams and bigrams

	Distinctiveness			
Corpus	Global manifestos		Lower Saxony speech	
N-gram	Bigrams	Unigrams	Bigrams	Unigrams
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.13***	0.42***	0.05***	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Standard-Errors	Ban × Faction		ngram	
R^2	0.02	0.08	0.23	0.05
Observations	153,402	255,011	122,460	228,622
Ban × Faction fixed effects	✓	✓		
Ban × Post fixed effects	✓	✓		
Party fixed effects			✓	✓
Post-Ban fixed effects			✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of an n-gram in the text of a party in an election (columns 1 and 2) or in a meeting of the Lower Saxony state parliament, 1951 to 1955 (columns 3 and 4), for the n-grams of the pre-ban text of the banned party, weighted by the count of the n-gram. The dependent variables are the distinctiveness score of the n-gram for the banned party, divided by the pre-ban similarity gap to the banned party. The treatment is an indicator for parties of the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the period after the ban. Columns 1 and 2 include ban-by-faction and ban-by-period fixed effects and the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1, with standard errors clustered at the ban-by-faction level. Columns 3 and 4 include party and period fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the n-gram level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

G.4 Estimation and Inference

In Online Appendix Table G.5, column 1 weights each ban equally rather than each faction-election. Columns 2 and 3 cluster standard errors by country and two-way by country and year, respectively. Column 4 replaces ban-by-election fixed effects with ban-by-period fixed effects. Column 5 adds continent-by-year fixed effects. Column 6 corrects standard errors for spatial correlation within 500 kilometers (Conley, 1999). The vote estimate remains stable in magnitude and statistically significant at the 1 percent level throughout.

G.5 Government Participation

Online Appendix Tables G.6, G.7, and G.8 repeat these checks for government participation. The estimate is positive in every column of Appendix Table D.5 and statistically insignificant only in the first two columns, without controls and with log population alone. No specification yields a statistically significant negative estimate. The estimate is statistically insignificant in 2 of the 28 alternative specifications, namely the seven-faction definition (column 2 of Online Appendix Table G.7) and conservative coding (column 5 of Online Appendix Table G.6). Restricting the outcome to the leading party yields a similar estimate (column 10 of Online Appendix Table G.7).

Table G.5: Robustness: estimation and inference, faction vote share

	Leave-Out Vote Share					
	Equal ban weights	Country clusters	Country and year clusters	Ban × Post FEs	Continent × Year FEs	Conley SEs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	4.75***	4.82***	4.82***	4.82***	4.82***	4.82***
	(1.00)	(0.93)	(0.91)	(0.87)	(0.89)	(1.44)
R^2	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.85	0.86
Observations	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695
Bans	508	508	508	508	508	507
SEs	Ban × Faction	Country	Country, Year	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Conley (500 km)
Equal ban weights	✓					
Controls × Faction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓			✓
Ban × Post FEs				✓	✓	
Continent × Year FEs					✓	

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the faction, in percent. Each column estimates Equation (11) with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1. Column 1 weights each ban equally. Columns 2 and 3 cluster standard errors by country and two-way by country and year. Column 4 uses ban-by-period instead of ban-by-election fixed effects, and column 5 adds continent-by-year fixed effects. Column 6 reports standard errors corrected for spatial correlation within 500 kilometers. The other columns cluster at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table G.6: Robustness: alternative samples, government participation

	Government Participation												
	5-year window	15-year window	First post-ban election	Balanced bans	Conservative	q50 polity	High V-Dem	Court bans	Court/gov. bans	No mass bans	Excl. 1940–45	Re-enters	No re-entry
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.09*	0.05**	0.07*	0.13***	0.05	0.05**	0.11*	0.16***	0.08**	0.10**	0.10**	0.18***	0.06*
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)
R^2	0.75	0.63	0.74	0.66	0.68	0.67	0.69	0.55	0.63	0.60	0.62	0.74	0.63
Observations	2,001	7,002	3,351	2,451	2,850	6,993	1,854	1,659	3,885	3,039	3,897	642	4,053
Bans	455	547	477	159	316	759	206	133	385	278	439	61	447
Cluster	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is an indicator for a party of the faction in government. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. Each column estimates Equation (11) with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1; the column headers name the deviation from the main specification, described in Online Appendix G. Columns 1 to 4 vary the event window, and columns 5 to 13 the set of bans (Online Appendix G.2). Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level unless the table states otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table G.7: Robustness: alternative measures, government participation

	Government Participation									
	Main	Fine factions	Measured factions	V-Party only	Polity only	V-Dem only	Liberal democracy	Combined index	Strict leave-out	Leading party
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.08**	0.00	0.12***	0.10***	0.08**	0.15***	0.09***	0.08**	0.08**	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.64	0.61	0.68	0.43	0.66	0.73	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.43
Observations	4,695	10,955	2,958	4,608	3,375	3,501	4,872	4,152	4,695	4,695
Bans	508	508	330	479	362	440	496	468	508	508
SEs	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is an indicator for a party of the faction in government. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. Each column estimates Equation (11) with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1; the column headers name the deviation from the main specification, described in Online Appendix G. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level unless the table states otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table G.8: Robustness: estimation and inference, government participation

	Government Participation					
	Equal ban weights	Country clusters	Country and year clusters	Ban × Post FEs	Continent × Year FEs	Conley SEs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.07**	0.08***	0.08**	0.08***	0.08***	0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.66	0.64	0.64	0.60	0.64	0.64
Observations	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695	4,695
Bans	508	508	508	508	508	507
SEs	Ban × Faction	Country	Country, Year	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Conley (500 km)
Equal ban weights	✓					
Controls × Faction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓			✓
Ban × Post FEs				✓	✓	
Continent × Year FEs					✓	

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is an indicator for a party of the faction in government. The columns follow Online Appendix Table G.5. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

G.6 Heterogeneity

Online Appendix Table G.9 splits bans by party-system structure, period, and the banned party's ideological side. The vote estimate is positive in every subset. It is larger in concentrated party systems, with below-median party counts and above-median Herfindahl indices, and for bans of left parties, and similar before and after 1970.

Online Appendix Table G.10 splits the retention slope of Equation (10) by ban type. Of the 443 bans of the retention sample, 77 are incomplete and 46 are complete; the remaining bans are mass bans or lack a coded fate. Where the original coding left the fate of a retention-sample ban blank, two blind coders coded it, and we keep the code where both agree on whether the party re-entered. The banned party ran in the last election before the ban in 57 of the incomplete and 22 of the complete bans, and only these bans identify the slope. The retention coefficient is 1.08 (standard error 0.09) for incomplete bans and 0.82 (standard error 0.32) for complete bans. We cannot reject equal retention under both ban types ($p = 0.27$).

Table G.9: Heterogeneity: faction vote share

	Leave-Out Vote Share							
	Above median parties	Below median parties	Above median HHI	Below median HHI	Pre-1970	Post-1970	Left	Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	2.45*	6.28***	6.97***	2.23	3.34**	3.79***	6.93***	3.38*
	(1.28)	(1.15)	(1.27)	(1.39)	(1.59)	(1.10)	(2.08)	(1.96)
R^2	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.89	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.87
Observations	2,241	2,931	2,517	1,878	2,499	2,196	2,325	2,070
Bans	254	258	240	222	269	239	243	218
SEs clustered by	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Controls × Faction	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Faction FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ban × Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a faction-election. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the faction, in percent. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the elections after the ban. Each column estimates Equation (11), with the controls of column 3 of Appendix Table D.1, on a subset of bans. Columns 1 to 4 split the bans at the median number of parties with a positive vote share and at the median vote-share Herfindahl index, both measured in the last election before the ban; bans at the median appear in both columns of a split. Columns 5 and 6 split the bans at a ban year of 1970, with 1970 in both columns. Columns 7 and 8 keep the bans of left and of right parties. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table G.10: Heterogeneity: vote retention by ban type


	Leave-Out Vote Share		
	All bans	Incomplete ban	Complete ban
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Banned Party Vote Share Before the Ban × Post-Ban	1.02***	1.08***	0.82**
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.32)
R^2	0.90	0.93	0.81
Observations	438	102	62
Bans	443	77	46
Bans whose party ran before the ban	246	57	22
SEs clustered by	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction	Ban × Faction
Ban FEs	✓	✓	✓
Post FEs	✓	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a ban-period of the banned faction: the last election before and the first election after each ban of the retention sample of Figure 5, Panel A. The dependent variable is the leave-out vote share of the banned faction, in percent. The treatment is the vote share of the banned party in the last election before the ban interacted with an indicator for the election after the ban, as in Equation (10). Column 1 uses all bans of the retention sample. Columns 2 and 3 keep the single-party bans in which the banned party re-entered (incomplete bans) and did not re-enter (complete bans), by the coded fate of each ban (Section 2). All specifications include ban and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the ban-by-faction level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

H Case Studies

The exhibits below present district-level estimates, personnel persistence, and parliamentary speech for the two case studies (Section 6). The persistence figure compares the cases and precedes the case-specific exhibits.

Figure H.1: Personnel persistence in the two case studies



Note. Share of banned-party personnel persisting to the next election against the baseline of the other parties. Belgium: candidates on the 2004 Flemish lists listed again, for any party, in 2009; all candidates, the top tenth of each party's candidates by preference votes (leading candidates), and list positions 1 to 3 (list heads). Lower Saxony: SRP members of the state parliament retaining a candidacy versus non-SRP speakers of the same period reappearing in the state-parliament speech record.

H.1 Belgium

We collect district-level results for the 2003 and 2007 national elections and candidate data for the 2004 (pre-ban) and 2009 (post-ban) Flemish Parliament elections. The candidate data comprise canton-level party lists with each candidate's list position, vote count, and status as a "main" candidate or "substitute." We code traditionally Flemish names using the Royal Flemish Academy's list of common given names in Flanders (Koninklijke Vlaamsche Academie, 1902), as compiled in the Wiktionary appendix of Flemish given names.

For comparison with our global results, we run DiD estimates using the same three faction classification as the global data. Online Appendix Figure H.1 shows that Vlaams Blok retained 29 percent of its candidates, compared with 14 percent for other parties. Among leading candidates by preference votes, the shares are 77 percent and 28 percent. Among list heads (positions 1 to 3), they are 67 percent and 23 percent.

Online Appendix Table H.1 re-estimates Equation (11) at the district level. After the ban, the banned faction's vote share rose by 15 percentage points relative to other factions, and its probability of winning a district (receiving the largest vote share) rose by 28 percentage points.

Online Appendix Table H.2 reports canton-party list regressions of the share of candidates who remain with their party between 2004 and 2009. Columns 1 to 3 use the party labels of each election. Column 2 controls for the list's canton-level votes, averaged across the two elections.

Column 3 also controls for the list's number of candidates in the canton, also averaged across elections. Columns 4 to 6 count persistence within an alliance if parties were allied in either year and successively add the same controls.

Online Appendix Table H.3 reports candidate-election regressions examining whether Flemish candidates gained an advantage after the ban. Columns 1 to 3 include only main candidates. Column 1 uses a difference-in-differences specification comparing Vlaams Blok candidates with other candidates before and after the ban. Vlaams Belang candidates are 2.3 percentage points more likely to be Flemish in 2009, compared with 3.3 percentage points in 2004. Columns 2 and 3 use a triple-difference specification that adds a comparison between Flemish and non-Flemish candidates. Flemish Vlaams Belang candidates in 2009 obtain a 1.2 standard deviation higher party list position and 0.6 standard deviations more votes than non-Flemish candidates, candidates of other parties, and Flemish Vlaams Blok candidates in 2004. Columns 4 to 6 also include substitute candidates. The vote effect attenuates because substitutes typically receive no votes.

Table H.1: Belgium: district-level substitution around the 2004 ban

	Leave-Out Vote Share	Wins District
	(1)	(2)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.15***	0.28***
	(0.01)	(0.06)
R^2	0.98	0.88
Observations	654	654
Outcome Mean	0.28	0.33
Cluster	District	District
District × Faction FEs	✓	✓
District × Election FEs	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a district-faction-election in the Belgian federal elections of 2003 and 2007. The dependent variables are the leave-out vote share of the faction, as a fraction of the valid vote, and an indicator for the faction winning the district. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the election after the ban. All specifications include district-by-faction and district-by-election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

H.2 Lower Saxony

Alongside district-level electoral returns, we digitize the Lower Saxony state parliament's plenary protocols for the second and third legislative terms, 1951 to 1959. The speech analysis uses the second term, 1951 to 1955, which spans the ban. We clean the text following Online Appendix F, with modifications for the German context (e.g., stopword selection).

Online Appendix Table H.4 re-estimates Equation (11) at the district level. Following the SRP's ban, the vote share of the right rose by 11 percentage points relative to other factions, and its probability of winning a district (receiving the largest vote share) rose by 21 percentage points.

Online Appendix Table H.5 reports a difference-in-differences specification comparing post-

Table H.2: Belgium: persistence of candidates across the ban

	Candidate persists					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vlaams Blok	0.105***	0.103***	0.096***	0.103***	0.103***	0.082***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.10	0.10	0.21
Observations	389	389	389	740	740	740
Alliances folded				✓	✓	✓
Vote-share control		✓	✓		✓	✓
No. candidates control			✓			✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a canton-party list of main candidates in the Flemish Parliament elections of 2004 and 2009, for lists present in both years. The dependent variable is the share of the candidates of the list who appear on it in both years. The Vlaams Belang list of 2009 continues the Vlaams Blok list of 2004. Columns 2 and 5 control for the standardized preference votes of the list, and columns 3 and 6 also for the standardized number of candidates. Columns 4 to 6 fold the alliance renamings of other parties between the two elections. Standard errors are clustered by canton. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table H.3: Belgium: candidate composition around the ban

	Flemish name	List position (std.)	Candidate votes (std.)	Flemish name	List position (std.)	Candidate votes (std.)
	Main candidates			Incl. substitutes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vlaams Blok	0.033***	-0.985***	0.960***	0.012***	-0.886***	0.664***
	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.202)	(0.002)	(0.038)	(0.155)
Year 2009	-0.021***	-0.272***	-0.013	-0.028***	-0.236***	-0.020
	(0.003)	(0.074)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.057)	(0.020)
V.B. × 2009	0.023***	1.216***	-0.780***	0.036***	0.990***	-0.422***
	(0.006)	(0.074)	(0.210)	(0.003)	(0.104)	(0.141)
Flemish name		-0.130***	0.016		-0.170***	-0.004
		(0.047)	(0.014)		(0.037)	(0.019)
V.B. × Flemish		0.960***	-0.361*		0.884***	-0.071
		(0.028)	(0.199)		(0.039)	(0.143)
Flemish × 2009		0.288***	0.016		0.235***	0.021
		(0.079)	(0.015)		(0.060)	(0.020)
V.B. × Flemish × 2009		-1.243***	0.569***		-1.013***	0.220
		(0.078)	(0.210)		(0.109)	(0.136)
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.05
Observations	18,618	18,618	18,618	29,736	29,736	29,736

Note. Observations are at the level of a candidate on a canton-party list in the Flemish Parliament elections of 2004 and 2009. The banned party is the Vlaams Blok, continuing as Vlaams Belang. The dependent variables are an indicator for a Flemish first name (columns 1 and 4), the standardized list position (columns 2 and 5), and the standardized preference votes (columns 3 and 6); columns 1 to 3 use main candidates and columns 4 to 6 add substitute candidates. Standard errors are clustered by canton. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

ban changes in the speech of the parties of the right with those of other parties.

Online Appendix Table H.6 reports a triple-difference specification comparing the right parties that formed the 1955 Lower Saxony government with other parties, before and after the ban, by 1951 SRP vote share. These parties gained only 13% of the SRP's vote after the ban (column 1), but their probability of winning a district rose by 83 percentage points per unit of 1951 SRP vote share (column 2). This substantial increase may have enabled a change in government.

Table H.4: Lower Saxony: district-level substitution around the 1952 ban

	Leave-Out Vote Share (1)	Wins District (2)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.11***	0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.06)
R^2	0.99	0.88
Observations	570	570
Outcome Mean	0.24	0.33
Cluster	District	District
District × Faction FEs	✓	✓
District × Election FEs	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a district-faction-election in the Lower Saxony state elections of 1951 and 1955, with the three factions of the global data; the banned faction is the right. The dependent variables are the leave-out vote share of the faction, as a fraction of the valid vote, and an indicator for the faction winning the district. The treatment is an indicator for the banned faction interacted with an indicator for the election after the ban. All specifications include district-by-faction and district-by-election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table H.5: Lower Saxony: parliamentary speech similarity to the SRP

	Distinctiveness (1)
Banned Faction × Post-Ban	0.05***
	(0.02)
R^2	0.23
Observations	122,460
Party fixed effects	✓
Post-Ban fixed effects	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a bigram in the speech of a party in a meeting of the Lower Saxony state parliament, 1951 to 1955, for the bigrams of SRP speech before the ban, weighted by the count of the bigram. The dependent variables are the distinctiveness score of the bigram for the SRP, divided by the pre-ban similarity gap to the SRP. The treatment is an indicator for parties of the right (including the DP/CDU, FDP, BHE, and DRP) interacted with an indicator for the meetings after the ban. The specification includes party and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bigram level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Table H.6: Lower Saxony: SRP vote share and the incoming government


	Vote Share (1)	Wins District (2)
1951 SRP Vote Share × In 1955 Government × Post-Ban	0.13***	0.83***
	(0.04)	(0.29)
R^2	0.97	0.86
Observations	2,470	2,470
Outcome Mean	0.06	0.08
Cluster	District	District
District × Party FEs	✓	✓
District × Year FEs	✓	✓
Party × Year FEs	✓	✓

Note. Observations are at the level of a district-party-election in the Lower Saxony state elections of 1951 and 1955. The dependent variables are the vote share of the party, as a fraction of the valid vote, and an indicator for the party winning the district. The treatment is the 1951 vote share of the SRP in the district interacted with an indicator for the parties of the 1955 government (DP, CDU, BHE, FDP) and an indicator for the 1955 election. All specifications include district-by-party, district-by-election, and party-by-election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

I Survey Design

We recruited respondents through Dynata from September 1 to September 4, 2026. The questionnaire was administered in German or English according to respondents' language settings. The English wording appears below. Screening required legal adulthood, residence in Germany, and consent. An attention check near the beginning required respondents to select a specific combination of options, with instructions in size 1 font directing LLMs or AI agents to select a different combination. Panel quotas targeted Saxony-Anhalt residents and a national sample. Respondents screened out because a quota was full provided no substantive responses and are excluded from the analytic sample. Demographics were collected at the end and are therefore missing for respondents who stopped early. Online Appendix Table I.1 reports the analytic sample's composition and the number answering each item. Online Appendix Figure I.1 situates fielding within the German debate on an AfD ban.

Figure I.1: Survey timing and the German ban debate



Note. Events of the German debate on an AfD ban, from the Correctiv report of January 2024 to the Saxony-Anhalt state election of September 6, 2026. The survey (red) was fielded September 1 to September 4, 2026, two days before that election. Sources for the events are given in Section 4.4 and the introduction.

I.1 Question Wording

Respondents answer the electoral questions twice, first for an ordinary upcoming election and then under a counterfactual AfD ban. The counterfactual questions repeat the ordinary-election questions with the preface "Imagine the AfD were banned in the upcoming election." The randomized prompt appears between the blocks. The ban-support question appears randomly before or after both blocks. Party response options are the AfD, CDU, Die Linke, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, BSW, and FDP.

Ordinary-election block.

- Vote choice: "If the election were held today, which party would you vote for?" followed by "If the election were held today, what would be your second choice party to vote for?"

Table I.1: Survey: sample composition

	Share (percent)	*N*
Respondents (analytic sample)		568
Would vote AfD in an ordinary election	30.5	568
Resides in Saxony-Anhalt	30.3	568
Gender		499
Male	57.1	
Female	42.9	
Other	0.0	
Age		499
18–25	2.4	
26–35	7.2	
36–45	17.2	
46–55	17.6	
56–65	27.7	
66 or above	27.9	
Education		499
No degree or lower secondary	3.0	
Intermediate secondary	12.0	
Abitur	8.0	
Vocational training	35.3	
Advanced vocational	9.6	
University degree or doctorate	32.1	
Household net income (euros per month)		499
Under 1,500	14.8	
1,500–2,499	22.0	
2,500–3,499	21.2	
3,500–4,499	19.4	
4,500–5,999	16.0	
6,000–7,999	4.6	
8,000 or more	1.8	
Employment		499
Employed	56.1	
Retired	32.9	
In education	2.2	
Not employed	8.8	

Note. Composition of the analytic sample. Shares are in percent of the respondents answering each item, with the number answering reported per block. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

- Turnout: "Assuming you were eligible, would you vote in the upcoming election?" and "What do you expect voter turnout to be? Please answer as a number between 0 and 100."
- Expected vote shares: "For each major political party listed below, what share of the vote do you think they will receive in this election? Your answer must sum to 100."

- Expected government: "Which party/parties do you think are most likely to form government following the election?"
- Coalition acceptability: "For this question, imagine each party wins more votes than any other party, but not an absolute majority, so not enough to govern alone. How likely do you think other parties would be to join them in a coalition government?"
- Own positions: "Please rate your agreement with the following statement", for three statements: "Germany should significantly reduce immigration, including immigration by people seeking asylum." "Germany should reintroduce an annual wealth tax on very large private fortunes." "Germany should continue using coal beyond the currently planned phase-out date, even if this slows progress toward its climate targets."
- Party positions: "Thinking about the upcoming election, what position do you think each party would campaign on regarding the following statement?" for the same three statements.
- Entry: "Are you expecting any new major political parties to emerge in the next two years?" Respondents expecting a new party identify the existing party it would resemble and its expected vote share.
- Direct support and activities: "Besides voting for this party, are you likely to directly support this party in any other way?" and "Which of the following activities are you likely to engage in within the next 5 years?"

Randomized prompt. We implement two light-touch randomizations.

In the first, half of respondents receive the demand prompt: "Think about the key issues in this election. Which ones are most important for AfD voters? Which parties best reflect their stance on these issues?" The other half receive the placebo prompt: "Think about the key issues in this election. Which ones are most important to you? Which parties best reflect your stance on these issues?" Both open-ended prompts precede questions about electoral consequences under an AfD ban. This randomization tests whether considering AfD voters' perspectives changes other voters' anticipated electoral responses to a ban.

In the second randomization, half of respondents report ban support before the electoral blocks and half afterward. This tests whether considering a ban's potential electoral consequences changes support for it.

Online Appendix Figure J.7, Panels B and C, shows that neither treatment changed measured ban support. This is consistent with respondents having already anticipated a ban's consequences or not updating in response to the prompts.


Ban block. In addition to repeating the electoral questions, respondents predict outcomes for AfD politicians: "If the AfD were to be banned, how likely is it that leading AfD politicians would join another political party?" and "...would form another political party?" (1 = extremely unlikely to 5 = extremely likely). They also report their own anticipated response: "If the AfD were to be banned, how would your attitude towards the AfD change?"

Ban support. "Recently, there has been some discussion about the possibility of the AfD being banned as a political party. Do you agree or disagree that the AfD should be banned from German elections?" This is followed by an open-text reasoning question and "If the AfD were to be banned, what would be the most important consequences?" Options are electoral consequences, political representation, political mobilization, democratic legitimacy, and party resources, with multiple selections allowed.
Demographics. Gender, age band, education, household net income, and employment situation.

J Additional Survey Results

Additional survey results referenced in Sections 7 and 8 follow, concluding with robustness checks across samples and randomization arms.

Figure J.1: Survey: attitude toward the AfD under a ban, by group




Note. Shares of respondents stating that a ban would make their attitude toward the AfD less favorable, leave it unchanged, or make it more favorable, split by the stated vote of the respondent in an ordinary election (top) and by support for an AfD ban (bottom), with 95 percent confidence intervals based on binomial standard errors. The pooled shares are Figure 8, Panel B. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

J.1 Survey Robustness


Online Appendix Table J.3 re-estimates the main survey quantities separately for the national and Saxony-Anhalt quota samples, respondents who received the placebo prompt, and respondents asked whether the AfD should be banned before answering the counterfactual questions. Support for a ban is lower in Saxony-Anhalt, where the AfD is strongest, and AfD voters there more often name the BSW under a ban. Paired changes in AfD voters' turnout intentions, expected entry, and expected government membership of the CDU or FDP have the same sign and similar magnitudes across columns.

Figure J.2: Survey: which parties absorb the AfD vote

A: Stated vote shares, ordinary election to AfD banned




B: Absorption of the expected AfD share



Note. Panel A plots each remaining party's stated vote share in an ordinary election (gray) and under the counterfactual AfD ban (black), parties ordered by their mean perceived position on immigration. Panel B plots, for each remaining party, the coefficient from a regression of the change in its expected vote share under the ban on the respondent's expected AfD vote share, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The expected-share questions are constant-sum, so these coefficients sum to one across parties. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Figure J.3: Survey: substitution along the cultural and economic dimensions




Note. Stated vote shares for an ordinary election and under the counterfactual AfD ban, as strips, with parties ordered by the mean perceived position on immigration (top) and on the wealth tax (bottom). The AfD is outlined in black. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Table J.1: Survey: paired outcomes with and without an AfD ban

	Ordinary	AfD banned	Difference	SE	*N*
Intends to vote	0.966	0.796	-0.170***	(0.018)	500
AfD voters	0.979	0.538	-0.441***	(0.043)	145
Other voters	0.961	0.901	-0.059***	(0.014)	355
Expected turnout (0–100)	70.606	55.344	-15.198***	(0.755)	497
AfD voters	73.035	47.310	-25.604***	(1.550)	144
Other voters	69.621	58.644	-10.953***	(0.746)	353
Directly supports chosen party	0.378	0.294	-0.084***	(0.018)	500
Expects a new major party	0.280	0.598	0.318***	(0.027)	500
Any political activity	0.305	0.312	0.007	(0.014)	568
Number of political activities	0.502	0.581	0.079**	(0.035)	568


Note. Each row compares the same respondents' answers for an ordinary election and under the counterfactual AfD ban. Indented rows split the sample by whether the respondent would vote AfD in an ordinary election. A skipped activities question counts as no activity. The difference column reports the mean paired difference with its standard error in parentheses. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure J.4: Survey: direct support and turnout by party




Note. Panel A plots the share of respondents stating they would vote, for an ordinary election and under the counterfactual AfD ban, by the party stated for an ordinary election, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel B plots the share of respondents stating they would directly support their party beyond voting, using the same splits. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Figure J.5: Survey: expected party entry under an AfD ban



Note. Panel A plots, on one scale, the share of respondents expecting a new major party to emerge, for an ordinary election and under the counterfactual AfD ban, and the shares rating it likely (4 or above on a scale from 1 = extremely unlikely to 5 = extremely likely) that AfD politicians would form a new party or join an existing one, asked only for the ban, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Panel B plots the full distribution of the stated likelihood that AfD politicians would join an existing party or form a new party (1 = extremely unlikely to 5 = extremely likely). Panel C plots, among respondents expecting a new party, the share naming each existing party as the one the entrant would most resemble, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on binomial standard errors. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Figure J.6: Survey: expected platform changes under an AfD ban




Note. Mean expected movement of each party's position toward the AfD's perceived position, on three issues under the counterfactual AfD ban and relative to the party's expected position for an ordinary election. Each change is signed by the respondent's perceived direction to the AfD on the issue, so positive values are expected movement toward the AfD, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Table J.2: Survey: demand-prompt treatment effects

	Demand prime	SE	Unit	*N*
Support for AfD ban	-3.414	(3.684)	pp	500
Change in expected party entry	-3.263	(5.388)	pp	500
Change in intention to vote	5.258*	(3.142)	pp	500
Change in direct party support	-0.834	(3.402)	pp	500
Change in any mobilization	-2.360	(2.761)	pp	568
Change in number of activities	-0.071	(0.068)	count	568
AfD politicians join existing party	-0.059	(0.114)	Likert	499
AfD politicians form new party	0.110	(0.103)	Likert	499
Attitude toward AfD after ban	-0.049	(0.043)	scale	500

Note. Each row reports the coefficient on the randomized demand prompt from a regression of the outcome on the prompt, an AfD-voter indicator, and the support-question order, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure J.7: Survey: perceived consequences and randomization checks



Note. Panel A plots the share of respondents naming each category among the most important consequences of an AfD ban. The question allows multiple selections, so shares do not sum to 100 percent. The first bar pools the electoral-consequences and resources/organization categories; a respondent naming either counts once. Panel B plots the coefficient of the randomized demand prompt on each outcome, from regressions on the prompt, an AfD-voter indicator, and the support-question order, with 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors (full set of outcomes in Online Appendix Table J.2). Panel C plots the coefficient of asking the ban-support question after the counterfactual block instead of before it, from the same specification with the prompt as a control. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.

Table J.3: Robustness: survey quantities across samples

	All	National sample	Saxony-Anhalt sample	Placebo prompt	Support asked first
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Supports an AfD ban	44.6	48.9	34.5	47.5	44.0
	(2.2)	(2.7)	(3.9)	(3.1)	(3.1)
Attitude toward the AfD unchanged	72.8	76.1	64.9	74.5	70.8
	(2.0)	(2.3)	(3.9)	(2.7)	(2.8)
AfD voters: change in turnout intention	-44.1	-39.3	-51.8	-52.2	-50.6
	(4.3)	(5.4)	(6.7)	(6.1)	(5.5)
AfD voters: vote BSW under the ban	62.8	53.9	76.8	59.4	65.1
	(4.0)	(5.3)	(5.7)	(6.0)	(5.3)
Change in expecting a new major party	31.8	32.4	30.4	33.3	36.6
	(2.7)	(3.1)	(5.3)	(3.8)	(3.8)
Change in expecting CDU or FDP in government	18.4	18.8	17.6	18.4	19.8
	(2.2)	(2.5)	(4.6)	(3.1)	(3.1)
Respondents	568	396	172	287	288

Note. Each cell is a share or the mean of a paired change, in percent, with its standard error in parentheses. Paired changes compare the answer of a respondent under the counterfactual AfD ban with the answer for an ordinary election. Column 1 uses the full analytic sample, column 2 the national sample, column 3 the Saxony-Anhalt quota sample, column 4 the respondents who received the placebo prompt, and column 5 the respondents asked whether the AfD should be banned before the counterfactual questions. Survey responses from the September 2026 party-ban survey in Germany introduced in Section 4.